

SPEECHES BY

A. Y. VYSHINSKY

ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS
PROHIBITION OF THE ATOMIC WEAPON
AND ON INTERNATIONAL CONTROL

DELIVERED IN THE
POLITICAL COMMITTEE
AT THE SIXTH SESSION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NOVEMBER 24, 1951
NOVEMBER 30, 1951
DECEMBER 12, 1951
DECEMBER 18, 1951

S P E E C H E S B Y
A. Y. V Y S H I N S K Y

**On the Reduction of Armaments,
Prohibition of the Atomic Weapon
and on International Control**

*Delivered in the Political Committee at the Sixth
Session of the United Nations General Assembly
—November 24, 1951, November 30, 1951,
December 12, 1951 and December 18, 1951*

T R A N S L A T E D F R O M T H E R U S S I A N

C O N T E N T S

<i>Speech of November 24, 1951</i>	5
<i>Speech of November 30, 1951</i>	36
<i>Speech of December 12, 1951</i>	64
<i>Speech of December 18, 1951</i>	87

Published by the Information Bulletin
Of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
2112 Massachusetts Avenue, Washington 8, D. C.
January, 1952



A. Y. VYSHINSKY

Speech in the Political Committee

November 24, 1951

Mr. Chairman, Messrs. Delegates:

FOLLOWING the declaration of the "Three" submitted to the General Assembly by the United States, Britain and France, the delegations of these same countries introduced their draft resolution on "regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments." There is no difference between these two documents either as regards the principle underlying them or as regards the substance of the solution of the problem raised. Both documents are designed to serve one objective and propose one and the same method for attaining this objective. Therefore one cannot agree with those who try to present the draft resolution of the "Three" as a step forward as compared with the declaration, referring to the fact that the draft resolution contains certain new elements and that this testifies to the readiness of the three Powers to meet the proposals of the Soviet Union halfway and reach some kind of agreement on the question under consideration.

I shall try to show how matters stand in reality in the opinion of the Soviet delegation. In doing it I shall treat with due attention — *sine ira et studio* — everything that has been said here by the supporters of the draft resolution of the "Three" and shall be guided solely by the interests of truth and the cause of peace which we are defending here.

We have carefully studied the proposals contained in this draft. We hold that it is impossible to judge these proposals properly if you take them separately from a number of facts that characterize the trend of the foreign policy of these countries, first and fore-

most of the United States, which plays a leading role in this matter.'

We are told here that the proposals contained in the draft resolution of the "Three" could become a turning point in history, a point at which the world could turn back from the tense situation and danger now facing every country. This was said by Mr. Acheson here on November 19 and following him has been repeated, like an echo, by other representatives of states, members of the same Atlantic camp.

Such an attitude to the draft resolution of the "Three" is devoid of any grounds, since this draft carefully avoids precisely those important questions which require an immediate solution and without whose solution no real turning point in history is possible. The resolution of the "Three" circumvents the very question of the armaments reduction, too, by surrounding the solution of this question with all kinds of groundless reservations and conditions whose objective must be clear to anyone who will carefully study this draft.

It is permissible to ask, however, of what, under these circumstances, "turning point in history" can the authors of the resolution speak, especially if we take into consideration that they themselves make no secret of the fact that the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces they propose in no way exclude the further increase of armaments and armed forces.

It was precisely these two principles, these two tasks, that Mr. Acheson put forth in his speech of November 8, seeking to prove that there was no contradiction whatever here since these, said he, were two sides of the same coin. One task, Mr. Acheson asserted, is to increase one's military might. This is one side of the coin. The other task is to work for peace. This is the other side of the coin. Here is a new two-faced Janus: one side of his face shows peace, the other — war.

Such a double-dealing policy, however, cannot serve and has never served the cause of peace, the interests of peace-loving countries and nations.

Mr. Acheson also said that the resolution of the "Three" opened the way for the solution of some of the greatest questions which are the object of discord between the East and West.

As for the Soviet Union, I must remind you that on October 5 of this year the Soviet Government declared to the Government of the United States, in connection with the oral statement of the United States Ambassador to the USSR Mr. Kirk, that adhering to its peaceful policy and unswerving in its desire to establish co-operation with all countries that are ready to cooperate with the Soviet Union, our Government is willing to examine *all* the important and unsettled issues with the participation of the Government of the United States and to discuss measures for improving international relations, including the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Thus, we have stated our readiness to examine "*all* the important and unsettled issues."

Mr. Acheson said that the proposal of the "Three" could open the path for settling "*some of the greatest questions.*" We say: "all," we are told: "some." We say: "settle all the questions," we are told: "let us settle some of the greatest questions." This, of course, is a detail, but this is a characteristic detail, though there is no need to dwell on it especially.

To calm those who might be sincerely alarmed and grieved at the prospect of a further armaments drive and preparation for war, covered up by talks about a reduction of armaments, about "work for peace" and other such fine words, Mr. Acheson found nothing better to state than that "there is no way of escaping this requirement."

We cannot agree with such a stand. The peoples of the world must not be regarded as doomed, as already condemned by a merciless fate, by some kind of destiny, eternally to bear the heavy burden of armaments and pay with their blood for the reckless policy of unleashing new wars.

If one is to accept Mr. Acheson's thesis that further armament is inevitable — and this is the main thesis of the entire foreign policy and diplomacy of the United States of America and certain states which support this policy — then one cannot seriously raise the question of a reduction of armaments and armed forces.

To introduce proposals for the reduction of armaments and armed forces and at the same time develop feverish activity to

increase one's armaments and armed forces, strengthen the existing aggressive military blocs and knock together new aggressive military blocs, like the so-called "Allied Command in the Middle East" — to do this means to try to cover up one's aggressive aims and plans with talk about reducing armaments and striving for peace.

Is it not clear that this "Allied Command in the Middle East" is aimed at drawing the states of the Near and Middle Eastern area into the war preparations of the aggressive Atlantic bloc under cover of the alleged "defense" of this area?

Under the pretext of "aid" to Egypt and to the other countries of this area, the four Powers, headed by the United States, are foisting their troops on these countries and are seeking to have military bases, ports, installations, armed forces and communications placed at the disposal of this command.

The organization of such a command is linked with extensive plans for setting up new and expanding the existing military bases in Egypt, Iraq and other countries of the Near and Middle East, prolonging the presence of foreign armed forces and bringing additional foreign armed forces to their territories, contrary to the clearly expressed will of their population.

Our note pertaining to this question pointed out that, if realized, this entire plan for setting up a so-called Middle Eastern Command must inevitably lead to the actual military occupation of the countries of the Near and Middle East by troops of the United States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which are located 12,000 to 15,000 kilometers away from this area, as well as by troops of certain other countries — members of the Atlantic alliance. The establishment of foreign military bases, in the first place American, on the territories of the Middle and Near Eastern states still more emphasizes the aggressive nature of this undertaking. References to the interests of the defense of the Near and Middle East cover up the involvement of these countries in the military measures of the Atlantic bloc, which are directed against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. It is known, however, that the Soviet Union is firm in its policy of peace and is the initiator and ardent champion of such important measures as the

prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control over this prohibition, as the reduction of armed forces of the five Great Powers by one-third, cessation of the aggressive war in Korea and conclusion of a Pact of Peace.

As for the countries of the East, including the Near and Middle East, it is generally known that sympathy for the national aspirations of the peoples of the East and for the struggle they wage to obtain national independence and sovereignty defines the policy of the Soviet Union toward these countries. Also known to all is the support which the Soviet Union has invariably rendered to these countries in the satisfaction of their lawful national demands. I shall remind you that it was precisely the Soviet Union which in 1946 supported in the Security Council the lawful demands of Syria and Lebanon for the evacuation of foreign troops from their territories; it was the Soviet Union that in 1947 in the Security Council supported the similar demands of Egypt.

All these facts speak for themselves and require no comment.

These facts make it clear what a difference there is in principle between the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a peace policy, and the policy of the imperialist states, which pursue aggressive ends. This policy also determines the stand of these Powers in considering such questions as the reduction of armaments and armed forces. No matter what honeyed speeches the representatives of these countries may make in the effort to lend a different appearance to this policy, the truth will out, as the saying goes.

Each day offers more new facts revealing the real nature of the foreign policy of the Atlantic bloc states, and first and foremost of the United States, whose ruling circles are obsessed by the maniacal idea of world domination. The more ruthless the facts exposing this policy become, the more urgent becomes the need to cover up, camouflage the aggressive nature of this policy, to style themselves as friends of peace and international cooperation. But how is this styling to be tallied with everything that is being done by the organizers

and leaders of the Atlantic bloc? They even go on to allege that the war, imposed by American interventionists on the Korean people, is being waged to defend the United States; that the war against the Vietnamese people is being waged to defend France, and that the British troops in Egypt are also acting out of peaceful considerations.

It is not accidental that the other day the Egyptian delegate stressed in this committee that the speech Mr. Eden had made at the Assembly, professing the peace-loving aspirations of British foreign policy, was hardly compatible with the present behavior of the British troops in the Suez Canal Zone. This was also confirmed by the Prime Minister of Egypt Nahas Pasha who, it seems, yesterday again drew attention to the excesses, marauding and all kinds of outrages perpetrated by the British troops in the Suez Canal Zone they had occupied.

The events in the Far, Near and Middle East fully dispel the legend about the peaceful aims and peaceful nature of the foreign policy of the Atlantic bloc.

The aggressive policy of the United States, which calls the tune in the Atlantic bloc, is an embodiment of the principles underlying the very foundation of this policy. It is known that the most important of these principles is the so-called establishment of "situations of strength," according to the favorite expression of Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson, a principle signifying the worship of armed force, upon which the United States leaders place all hopes.

Why, it was precisely Mr. Truman who said that the possibility of ensuring peace will be greater if the United States unswervingly realizes its military program. When asked whether this statement could be interpreted in the sense that the United States would sooner rely on strength than on agreement with the Soviet Union, Mr. Truman replied in the affirmative, adding that this was necessary under the present circumstances.

Still earlier, in his message to Congress in January this year, Mr. Truman said that creation of United States military might was "the only realistic road to peace."

Formulating the principles and aims of United States foreign policy, the USA Secretary of State on his part stressed the importance of increasing the American armed forces, pointing out that the armed forces of the United States were expanding, that new types of weapons were being forged and that simultaneously the allies of the United States, (*i.e.*, the very same members of the Atlantic bloc), were increasing their war production and re-establishing their armed forces.

In a speech in Detroit on the occasion of the 250th anniversary of that city, Acheson energetically praised the successes achieved in organizing the armed forces of the Atlantic bloc, mentioning such, as he said, positive facts as the formation of new divisions, maneuvers of tactical air force, expansion of the chain of American tactical air bases in Europe and development of war production in Western Europe. In a word, Mr. Acheson spoke like a real war minister or like a commander in chief of an army getting ready for a campaign. He praised the "Schuman plan" as "bold and very promising," although it is generally known that this plan for merging the coal and metallurgical industries of Western Europe on the basis of the Ruhr, this age-old seat of Prussian militarism and Hitlerite aggression, is directed at increasing the war potential of the Atlantic bloc and represents a direct threat to the security of Western Germany's neighbors, including France, to the security of all of Europe and consequently to the general security of all peoples.

Mr. Acheson frankly spoke of the efforts of the United States to build up "situations of strength" in Asia, the Middle East and other countries of the world, humoring himself and others that these "situations of strength" would force the Soviet Union to yield to the aggressive demands and claims of the United States. One should wonder how imprudent and short-sighted the USA Secretary of State is in supposing that the Soviet Union could be made to do anything by force and in not understanding that this is altogether unsuitable language with regard to the Soviet Union.

In February 1950, at a reception in the White House arranged

by the Advertising Council, Mr. Acheson said that the only way to do business with the Soviet Union was to create a situation in which strength would be reckoned with.

To mislead the American people and the peoples of other countries participating in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, lies and slanderous inventions are circulated about the Soviet Union, which is allegedly threatening to attack the United States or some other country.

The absurdity and falsity of such statements have already been exposed more than once by the Soviet Union.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union J. V. Stalin pointed out in the interview given to a *Pravda* correspondent in February this year that the Soviet Union, like any state in the world in general, cannot develop its civilian industry to the full, undertake huge construction works like the hydroelectric stations on the Volga, Dnieper and the Amu Darya which require tens of billions in budgetary outlays, continue a policy of systematically reducing prices of articles of mass consumption, which likewise requires tens of billions in budgetary outlays, and invest hundreds of billions in the rehabilitation of the national economy shattered by the German invaders, and at the same time, simultaneously with this, enlarge its armed forces and expand its war industry. J. V. Stalin pointed out that "so reckless a policy would have led any state into bankruptcy." And today, right here in the capital of France, we ourselves feel the full justice of this remarkable prediction.

Today we already have numerous facts fully confirming this statement of J. V. Stalin. The economic and financial position of Great Britain, France and a number of other countries, which is the result of the subordination of these countries to the aggressive policy of the United States, has deteriorated to such an extent that this can no longer be concealed.

The other day the newspaper *Le Monde* wrote:

"Europe is now living through the most serious crisis since liberation. Its denouement is near. It may be very dangerous for France and for the cause of peace. But this danger can still be

averted if those who play a part in this matter agree to overcome their prejudice. It is a dual crisis: economic and political.

"Until now there was talk only of its first aspect, which after the alarming speeches of Butler and R. Mayer disturbed Mr. Acheson as well . . ."

The British journal *Tribune*, speaking of "aid" which Britain has to receive from America, said that this aid would be given and added that it would be given, but "not with the aim of making our economy viable but for the precise and declared purpose of enabling us to carry a rearmament burden which would otherwise break our backs . . ."

France is groaning under the weight of economic difficulties caused by so-called rearmament, *i.e.*, expansion of the armed forces of France . . . Great Britain fears that the burden of rearmament might break her back.

As for the situation in the underdeveloped countries, it is characterized by the following facts: they have become poorer in the past 10 years; they have less food than they had 10 years ago; they have no internal resources to cover the shortage of capital since, in addition to everything else, they do not fully control their natural wealth and since a substantial and disproportionate part of the income derived from this wealth is exported. In other words, these countries are being robbed by the foreign monopolists. An insignificant part of the annual profits derived from the present capital investments — only one per cent of what the Atlantic commonwealth, *i.e.*, the Atlantic bloc, spends on its rearmament program — is set aside for accomplishing the tremendous task connected with developing the underdeveloped countries.

This is almost a word for word outline of what was said by the President of the United Nations Economic and Social Council, the Chilean delegate Santa Cruz who can also in no way be suspected of a disposition to paint a gloomy picture of the situation in the capitalist countries or to engage in propaganda exposing the pernicious influence of the United States foreign policy on the economic position of the countries of the capitalist world. (I must however explain that the words: "in other words, these countries are being robbed by the foreign monopolists," do not belong to

Santa Cruz but to me. All the rest outlines the content of his speech almost textually.)

Such are the results of the present foreign political course of the United States, which has already made itself definitely felt in such countries as Great Britain, France, Belgium and a number of other countries, including so-called little- or under-developed countries. Yet the United States continues to pursue its line, counting on its dollars, on their alleged magic power.

As we have already been able to learn from the statements of authoritative American spokesmen, the United States continues to steer a course of foreign policy associated with the frenzied armaments drive and precluding any serious measures for an armaments reduction. Here the idée fixe, this positive obsession of the leaders of the United States that they must preserve for the United States the military superiority of which they love to talk so much, especially in the fields of aviation and atomic weapons, continues to dominate. It was of this that Mr. Acheson spoke at a joint meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees in February this year. He argued that the best method for utilizing the United States advantage in aviation was "to move ahead under this protective shield to build the balanced collective forces in Western Europe," to continue along this path even after, as Mr. Acheson put it, the superiority of the United States in atomic weapons lessens. In anticipation of the inevitable advent of such time, leading statesmen of the United States declare that they will continue to adhere at all levels of state power to the present course of action, the object of which is the further expansion and establishment of new armed forces and armaments. This, Mr. Acheson said, is the greatest contribution to peace. I should like to invite the Messrs. delegates to ponder seriously on the meaning of this and to compare all these statements, extolling the cult of force and the need for further expanding their armed forces, further strengthening military bases, organizing new bases, consolidating the existing bases, further developing atomic weapons, with this plan of so-called reduction of armaments

which is depicted here as a turning point in world history. Then perhaps it will become clearer whether it is in place to say that a hand is being extended to us, or whether it is more to the point to say that a hand brandishing arms is being extended to us.

This is how matters stand in reality.

We considered it necessary to review all these facts, not out of a predilection for polemics, but because it is necessary to put all things in their proper places, it is necessary to call each thing by its real name, because it is necessary to review deeds in order to appraise the true meaning of words. Without this condition no serious and fruitful discussion of important problems is possible.

The real aims of the foreign policy of the United States can, however, be judged not only by what American diplomats say but also by what they do not say and by what the American monopolists themselves reveal. In this respect two very recent facts are noteworthy. One is the 38th annual convention of the so-called National Foreign Trade Council held in the United States at the end of October this year with the participation of representatives of the Morgan monopolies—the United States Steel Corporation and General Electric; the Rockefeller monopolies—Standard Oil of New Jersey and Chase National Bank; the Du Pont General Motors Corporation; and so on.

It is sufficient to name these so-called corporations, monopolies of Morgan, Rockefeller, and Du Pont for it to become clear that we are dealing here with an important force which controls the destiny of the United States and wants to control the destiny of the entire world.

The declaration adopted by the convention states that the United States foreign economic policy should be "directed aggressively toward facilitating the contribution which private industry can make in increasing raw material production in foreign lands and toward assuring the availability of these materials in a quantity adequate to meet our growing requirements in the United States. . . ."

Aggressively directed toward seizing the raw materials in foreign countries!

That the American monopolists have no intention of being fastidious about the means of seizing the raw material resources of other countries is also evident from the following place in this declaration:

"The convention," the declaration reads, "holds it to be essential . . . that the tremendous diplomatic, political and economic facilities at the disposal of the United States Government be exerted aggressively . . . This dilemma, which could be fatal to the whole program of economic expansion abroad, can be resolved only by forthright and aggressive action on the part of the United States Government in the field of its fundamental foreign economic policy."

It is characteristic that Mr. Truman sent a message of greeting to the convention thus stressing his support of the program adopted by the National Foreign Trade Council. And this is natural because it is precisely these monopolistic circles that determine the trend of the entire foreign policy of the United States and the entire position in this respect of the American Government and the State Department, the American Government and representatives of the American Government at this Assembly. They are speaking a language in the interests of precisely these monopolies, of this, I should say, 38th convention of the so-called National Foreign Trade Council.

The second fact likewise worthy of serious attention is the First International Conference of Manufacturers, scheduled to be held in New York in the beginning of December, to which 300 big industrialists of Europe, including industrialists from Western Germany, have been invited; among them are Mann, head of the chemical trade group in Western Germany; Fritz Berg, president of the German Industrial Federation; Knut Hall, president of the Norwegian Industrial Federation; and others. The principal question to be discussed at this conference is that of accelerating arms production.

And so the convention of the National Foreign Trade Council, the conference of which I have just spoken, the

conference which is opening in Rome today to which Mr. Eden and Mr. Acheson hastened, having no more important interest than what will take place at this conference in Rome, at the so-called Atlantic bloc council where the interests of peace will be considered in a different aspect, in other words, where attention will be devoted to one side of the same coin of which Mr. Acheson spoke here. The other side of the coin—to work for peace—is today left to the attention of lesser representatives of the United States of America because Mr. Acheson has no time to spend here on talk about peace. He must "make peace," "work for peace" and he hurries off to work these days together with Adenauer and other plotters against peace in Rome where Mr. Eden has also hastened, having no time to be here with us where vital and urgent problems of peace are being discussed.

Everyone acts in accordance with his interests and the interests of those who have sent him to do their will.

And now attempts are being made to persuade us that in this atmosphere of war psychosis and war fever, when all the efforts of the leading circles of the United States are being concentrated on carrying out war plans that have nothing in common, and can have nothing in common, with the so-called defense of the United States, they speak here in a serious vein of some desire to reduce armaments and armed forces.

Under such circumstances, can the representatives of the three Powers offer anything more than what they offer in their puny draft resolution on the so-called armaments reduction?

We have seen what is the real aim, what is the real desire of the National Foreign Trade Council, this influential organization of the American monopolists, whose weight in defining policy, including also the foreign policy of the United States, is well known.

* * *

IT has been said here that the draft resolution of the United States, Britain and France for the reduction of armaments is "new and bold."

It is necessary however to say outright that this draft altogether ignores the accumulated experience and the disappointment suffered. This plan is not new, for it is framed in full conformity with the principles of the so-called "Baruch plan," which principles are known to all and have long been rejected by a number of countries. This plan is not bold for it does not give a single worthy solution of the problems raised in this draft. Suffice it to say that the entire plan of the so-called reduction of armaments and armed forces proposed in this draft is made directly dependent on a number of preliminary conditions, some of which are mentioned in this draft and some of which are not but are intensively mentioned in the speeches made by the authors of this draft.

This for example is how matters stand with such a preliminary condition as the cessation of war in Korea. In the declaration of the "Three" this condition was recorded in item six which said directly that the general program of reduction could not be put into operation as long as war continued in Korea, and pointed to the necessity of simultaneously solving also the political questions dividing the world. Now this is not mentioned in the draft resolution. This, however, does not mean that the authors of the resolution of the "Three" have given up this preliminary condition. Indeed, if you recall Mr. Acheson's speech made in the First Committee you will see that he continues to insist on this preliminary condition. In that speech of his Mr. Acheson stated that the system of armaments reduction could not be put into operation while the war continued in Korea and that as long as this situation remained no plan could be implemented.

This reference to the war in Korea is a mere pretext for evading agreement on the reduction of armaments. If matters stood differently how could one understand the statement made by Acheson last June when, in answer to the question as to whether the government would be satisfied with a sum smaller than that envisaged in the mutual security bill if the situation in Korea were settled, he replied that if there were a settlement

in Korea this program would not be reduced or cut in any respect.

What does this mean? It only means that last June we were told that no matter whether the question of the Korean war was settled or not, whether the war in Korea ended or not, this could in no way influence the program of armaments drawn up and approved by the American Government, by Congress. And here we are told: we cannot agree to a reduction of armaments before the war in Korea ends. This is an important condition. It would be senseless to speak of disarmament, Mr. Acheson said, when we are waging a war and when arms are required. Later on, when Mr. Acheson encountered the resistance of many delegates—open resistance on the part of some, as for example on the part of the USSR delegation, and hidden resistance on the part of others, though the latter are still forced to vote for the American proposals—the American delegation resorted to a maneuver.

Haste was made to delete this point from the resolution, the point about the preliminary condition, but the same thing is being reiterated in the speeches, *i.e.*, that cessation of the war in Korea is a preliminary condition for the reduction of armaments. Here you have the gauge of sincerity of those who extend a "belaundist" hand, *i.e.*, the hand of which Mr. Belaunde spoke. He has not extended his own hand so far.

It is clearly evident from Mr. Acheson's June statement that there is no connection whatsoever between the question of the armaments reduction and cessation of the war in Korea. Yet it is precisely cessation of the war in Korea that is now being put forth as a preliminary condition for reducing armaments, although this is being smuggled through in speeches explaining the resolution in which this point no longer figures.

At the same time everything is being done to drag out the war in Korea, to drag out the negotiations for cessation of hostilities. Mr. Eden has even stated in the House of Commons that the question of war prisoners is one of the indispensable conditions for ceasing fire in Korea, for ceasing hostilities. But can cease-fire be made a preliminary condition for paving the way to a

further peaceful settlement? Now the exchange of war prisoners is already being put forth by the Anglo-American bloc as a new additional condition for the cessation of hostilities.

This means another attempt, another pretext, another captious objection, another means of disrupting the negotiations in Korea on ending the war. Now, compare all these, one with another, and then tell yourself how to appraise these so-called proposals for a reduction of armaments and these preliminary conditions, tell yourself, not us, not here, not during voting, tell yourself and tell your conscience . . . In reality, of course, there is no connection between these questions, and linking the termination of the war in Korea to the question of armaments reduction is devoid of any ground whatsoever. This is all the more so because the very cessation of the war in Korea fully depends upon the Government of the United States,

The White House merely has to give an appropriate signal and the war in Korea will end. Consequently it will be easy to eliminate one of the obstacles which the American Government sees in the way of reducing armaments and the armed forces.

The situation as regards the other preliminary conditions too is no better. We heard Mr. Acheson point to the connection between the reduction of armaments and the elimination of tension in international relations. He said that "if we are honest, if we are stating what is true and if we are not making slogans or not making propaganda we will say that if, at the time this system of reduction of armaments is worked out, we are in a period of highly mounting tensions and additional frictions throughout the world, it is highly unlikely that nations would enter into a system of armaments reduction." And further: "In candor and in honesty we must say that there is a direct relation between the ability to put into effect a system of disarmament and the international temperature. If the international temperature is approaching the boiling point, few things are possible. If it has reduced so that solutions of problems are on the way and are quite possible, then disarmament becomes a wholly different thing so far as the immediate future is concerned."

What is true is true. But is it not precisely the American Gov-

ernment that bears responsibility for the fact that the political atmosphere is becoming ever more heated, that the political temperature keeps rising? Certainly it does, no matter how hard the representatives of the United States may shun this responsibility, no matter how hard they may try to evade it.

To confirm this one could cite many facts. I already spoke about them last time when reviewing the foreign policy of the United States toward Korea, the People's Republic of China, Germany, Iran, Egypt, Trieste, Austria, and so on and so forth.

All these facts accordingly affect the temperature in international relations. As for the Soviet Union specifically, with regard to which the United States is obviously pursuing its aggressive line, breaking international agreements with the Soviet Union and implementing measures that endanger the security of the USSR and carry the threat of another world war, such facts are generally known and I have already spoken about them too. I shall add to what was said, but only those facts which refer directly to recent times.

It is known that almost on the eve of this session, in the middle of October, the President of the United States, Mr. Truman, signed a new law known under the title of the "Mutual Security Act of 1951." This law envisages the special appropriation of 100 million dollars for financing — I am citing the respective point from this law — "any selected persons who are residing in or escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania . . . either to form such persons into elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or for other purposes."

This law provides, as we see, that the United States would finance persons and armed groups on the territory of the Soviet Union and a number of other states for carrying out subversive activity and sabotage within the above states. The law points out directly that the Government of the United States undertakes to pay people who fled from the USSR and other countries enumerated in this law or even residing in these countries, and that it undertakes to finance uniting them into special armed detachments. In other words, the Govern-

ment of the United States of America undertakes to organize and finance armed groups from among persons, both who are residing in the USSR and who have fled from there, for the struggle against the Soviet Union. Such actions of the United States constitute an unprecedented intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of the USSR and the People's Democracies mentioned in this new American law. This direct intervention of the United States in the internal affairs of other countries also represents a violation of both the generally recognized standards of international law and the principles underlying the United Nations Charter. It also constitutes a crass violation by the United States of the Soviet-American agreement of November 16, 1933 concluded by the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR M. M. Litvinov and the President of the United States of America Franklin D. Roosevelt during the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Under that agreement, sealed by the signature of President Roosevelt on the part of the United States, the Governments of the USSR and the United States mutually undertook to respect the sovereignty of both states—this is said in the international agreement of whose sanctity certain delegates, Mr. Eden in particular, have spoken at such length here.

The adoption of the law envisaging the appropriation of 100 million dollars for subversive activity and sabotage against the Soviet Union shows that the government of the United States of America, crassly violating the commitments it assumed, thereby continues to pursue a policy of further worsening relations with the Soviet Union and further aggravating the international situation.

By promulgating its "Act of 1951" the United States Government has permitted itself to commit an unparalleled violation of international standards, a violation which is incompatible with normal relations between countries and respect for state sovereignty. Such an act cannot be regarded otherwise than as an aggressive act designed to further complicate

relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and aggravate the international situation.

The Soviet Government has lodged a resolute protest with the United States Government against this new aggressive act of the Government of the United States toward the Soviet Union and against the crass violation by the United States of commitments it assumed under the agreement of November 16, 1933 and placed all responsibility for such actions upon the Government of the United States and stated that it expects the United States Government to take appropriate measures for repealing the above law.

This unexampled, unprecedented act demands that the United Nations intervene in this matter. On the instructions of my Government I have submitted a proposal to include on the agenda of the General Assembly the question of this "Act of 1951" as highly urgent and important so as to have the General Assembly recommend to those who are still capable of heeding its recommendations the repeal of such an unparalleled attack on the United Nations Charter, on our sovereign rights, on the Soviet Union.

The question arises in face of such actions of the United States Government: How can they, without indulging in hypocrisy and falsehood, speak of striving to relieve the tension in international relations? How can they present this relieving of the tension in international relations as a preliminary condition for adopting this resolution on the reduction of armaments and armed forces?

I think this is irreconcilable.

In his speech Mr. Acheson tried to allege that the draft resolution of the "Three" envisaged prohibition of the atomic weapon. In reality the draft resolution contains no prohibition of the atomic weapon whatever. If you examine this draft you will easily become convinced of this. The draft speaks of the necessity of establishing international control so as to ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon. But this does not at all resemble prohibition of the atomic weapon. We have already met such a formula before and always did the legiti-

mate question arise: How can any international control agency ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon if there is no decision on prohibition of the atomic weapon?

I deem it necessary to remind you that as early as during the First Session of the General Assembly in 1946 a decision was taken obligating the Atomic Energy Commission to submit its proposals for the removal of the atomic weapon from national armaments. What is the difference between this decision taken in 1946 and the present draft resolution proposed by the representatives of the three Powers? Actually there is no difference whatever between them. Still, it is a fact that the decision of the General Assembly of 1946 has not been fulfilled and there has been no prohibition of the atomic weapon to this day. That is why it is absolutely wrong to present the draft resolution of the "Three" as allegedly providing for the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

I must also remind you that the delegation of the USSR has repeatedly introduced its proposals for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control over the implementation of this prohibition. On November 16 of this year the USSR delegation submitted a proposal that the General Assembly declare the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition.

There is nothing resembling this proposal in the draft resolution of the three Powers. Herein lies the fundamental difference, a difference in principle between the proposal of the three Powers and that of the Soviet Union.

However, a decision on the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of such prohibition by itself is still insufficient.

That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union proposes that the General Assembly also adopt another decision: "To instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare and submit by February 1, 1952 for consideration of the Security Council a draft convention envisaging measures that en-

sure fulfillment of the decisions of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, the discontinuation of its production, and the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs already produced, and on the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the above convention."

We are told that it would be unacceptable to prohibit the atomic weapon without establishing international control over the implementation of such prohibition because this can endanger the position of those states which will scrupulously fulfill such a decision on the prohibition of the atomic weapon while some other state ventures to violate this decision. But we do propose to prohibit the atomic weapon and to establish international control, providing for this either in one convention or two conventions which should be concluded simultaneously.

But this is being rejected. These, we are told, are simply "*paroles*," that is, mere words. It turns out that to prohibit the atomic weapon is "*paroles*," while to instruct the commission merely to study the possibility of ensuring prohibition of the atomic weapon is a concrete deed.

All these are fairy tales for very small children. These are fairy tales of Andersen, Hauff—I do not want to insult the representatives of the Arab countries and for this reason I will not say "Arabian tales" although I must admit that they are charming both for their imagination and beauty of conception. But it is sufficient to recall Andersen, Hauff or our Russian fairy tales, for example, one about the wolf and Little Red Riding Hood (*laughter*), how the wolf wanted to devour Little Red Riding Hood and pretended to be her most devoted friend (*laughter*). Well, and what were the results? The wolf devoured Little Red Riding Hood. But since then "Little Red Riding Hoods" have become so strong and powerful that it is no longer easy to devour them, let alone to deceive them.

If it is incorrect to prohibit the atomic weapon without establishing international control over the implementation of this prohibition, it is also incorrect to establish international control without prohibiting the manufacture of the atomic weapon at the same time. This should be all the more clear because any control

presupposes the existence of the object to which this control should be extended. We however are offered establishment of international control, while prohibition of the atomic weapon and even the very so-called disclosure and verification of information about the atomic weapon, about which the draft resolution of the "Three" also speaks, is to be postponed for some indefinite time. True, this date is quickly fixed. It is called *sine die* — without fixing the day.

At previous sessions the Soviet Union also demanded prohibition of the atomic weapon. But each time this demand of the Soviet Union was rejected, and those rejecting it were not ashamed at the same time to hold out the threat of using atom bombs. It is clear that it is good for those who prepare to attack the Soviet Union to preserve some kind of advantage for themselves in this matter, at first the advantage of monopolists, when the United States considered itself the monopolist in this sphere, and then, after such a monopoly was eliminated, the quantitative advantage, for which the United States still has hopes.

In the reply to a *Pravda* correspondent "On the Atomic Weapon" the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, J. V. Stalin, pointed out that the United States would like to have a monopoly of the production of atomic bombs and have unlimited opportunity to intimidate and blackmail other countries and that the proponents of the atomic bomb "may agree to the prohibition of the atomic weapon only if they see that they are no longer monopolists."

To prove that the United States stands for the prohibition of the atomic weapon Mr. Acheson referred to the fact that in 1946, in the commission presided over by Acheson, Baruch had proposed to discontinue the manufacture of atom bombs and to destroy the existing atom bombs. Mr. Acheson, however, said nothing about the fact that in advancing his proposal for the prohibition of the atomic weapon Baruch made it dependent not upon a respective international agreement but upon the internal legislation of the United States. As for the destruction of the atom bombs already produced—again everything was only an empty phrase. Why, it is known to all, at least this should be

known to Mr. Acheson, that this question of destroying stocks of ready atomic weapons and atomic weapons which were being completed was raised in 1947 in the Atomic Energy Commission not by Baruch, but by the representative of the Soviet Union. This proposal envisaged the destruction of the atomic weapon with nuclear fuel being used solely for peaceful purposes. Then all the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, except the representative of the United States, agreed with this plan. The representatives of Britain (Thomson), Canada (McNaughton), Brazil (Alberto), China (Wei), Australia (Hodgson) agreed with this plan at that time. The only one not to agree was the representative of the United States (Osborn). Here we have an answer as to how the Americans proposed to destroy atom bombs. The representative of the United States Osborn stated then that the provisions of the international treaty on atomic energy must be implemented step by step and that only at a definite stage of the implementation of this treaty would liquidation of the atomic weapon in one way or another be provided for. The proposal submitted by the USSR representative for the destruction of manufactured atom bombs was rejected. These facts show that when the matter really reaches the point of prohibiting the atomic weapon and destroying manufactured atom bombs, it invariably encounters resistance on the part of the United States. It has been so before; it will evidently be so now.

* * *

SEETING to prove that the United States favored prohibition of the atomic weapon in the past too, Mr. Acheson tried to interpret his letter of 1946 in a sense favorable for the stand taken by his commission. He pointed out that this letter also said at what stage of the drafting of the plan prohibition of the atomic weapon would be necessary. This, however, is not the point at issue at all, but the point at issue is that no matter at what stage this would be necessary, Mr. Acheson's commission recognized that the decision, no matter when it might be taken, would be connected with considerations of high policy affecting the security of the United States and, as it is put in Mr. Acheson's

letter, "must be made by our Government under its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world situation."

What could this mean if not that when matters reach the point of prohibiting the atomic weapon, although this might be envisaged by any kind of international agreement either in the form of the Baruch plan or any other document, the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon would be decided "in the light of all the facts of the world situation," *i.e.*, irrespective of plan or international agreement. It is absolutely impossible to interpret this as Mr. Acheson would like it, as a recognition of the need for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon. It is necessary to add to this that the distinctive feature of the Baruch plan consists precisely in the fact that the solution of the question of prohibiting the atomic weapon can, with the help of the stage system, be postponed for an indefinite time. Another distinctive feature of this plan is that the production of atomic energy in amounts that could serve for the production of the atomic weapon, and in such a case would be recognized as dangerous, is placed at the exclusive disposal of the international control agency and that all the atomic plants are placed in its sole possession.

But what might this international agency be? Here is what Baruch said about this, referring to the composition of this agency: "The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on a basis of proven competence but also so far as possible on an international basis."

It follows from Baruch's statement that first of all these must be people extremely competent in this field—it may be said in advance that the Americans will always argue that their scientists like Lilienthal, Barnard, Thomas and others are the most competent persons—that there are none more competent. And secondly, "*so far as possible*" the agency should be international. Now if we were told that the United Nations Organization should be "*so far as possible*" international, what would our attitude be, although right now we already have something of the sort? But we are not satisfied when in our international organization, in the United Nations Organization, members of the Atlantic bloc

boss the whole show, when the United States of America does everything it wants in the United Nations. For instance we say: the United States of America was the first to raise the question of arms reduction at the General Assembly. Therefore, in all justice, this question should be taken up first at our session as the United States was first to submit it. Following the United States we submitted our question "On Measures against the Threat of Another World War and for the Strengthening of Peace and Friendship among Nations." We demanded that it be second on the agenda. But the United States delegation did not agree to this, and this question was put fifth.

Now elections to the Security Council are to be held. Yugoslavia's term in the Security Council is ending. Yugoslavia is a Slav country. Under the agreement in London seats in the Security Council should belong not only to representatives of Western Europe but also to a representative of Eastern Europe, of Slav countries, and also to representatives of the Latin American region, etc. In the past we demanded and we now demand that according to the established tradition, to the gentlemen's agreement concluded in 1946, the candidate to the Security Council should be proposed by the countries of the corresponding geographic region. Until 1949 this is what was done, but then they began to hinder the group of Slav delegations from carrying this out, imposing their own candidate on them.

Last time they wanted to propose Yugoslavia—to spite us—they proposed her and pushed her through. Now they have discovered a new "Slav" country—Greece (*laughter*). And they want to impose this new "Slav" on us as a representative of Eastern Europe, *i.e.*, of the region to which the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Byelorussia and the Ukraine belong, and only by agreement among whose representatives may a candidate to the Security Council be proposed.

In 1949 we objected to Yugoslavia for no other reason except that it had vaulted over to the other camp and betrayed this principle, not desiring to take into consideration the will of the majority of states of this region which deprived her of the right to claim to represent the countries of precisely *this* region. This

time we proposed Byelorussia for the Security Council. But the Anglo-American bloc proposes Greece from the countries of Eastern Europe. They also propose another "Slav" country, newly invented for this case—the Philippines (*laughter*).

Collusion is in progress behind our back, a bargain with regard to the elections to the Security Council is being struck, and it has even been hinted to us that their support of Byelorussia will depend on how tractable we are in our today's speech. But I must declare that we will not bargain. We will fight for our right to propose our candidate and insist on his election—we will also expose the crafty technique of the violators of this right of ours under the Charter. By the way, this technique is not so very crafty. Thus if members of such an international organization as the United Nations conduct themselves in this manner here, then what can we expect of a so-called international control authority when the Americans themselves, Baruch for instance, admit that this authority must be international only *so far as possible*, stipulating that of course most competent persons should be in it. And who are these? American atom mongers. Very "competent persons" who have shown their "competence" at Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . .

It is clear to us that this stipulation that the control authority will be "so far as possible on an international basis" indicates that there may be no such possibility. In any case there is no guarantee whatever that there will be such a possibility. Thus it should be clear that in composition this agency, as contemplated under the Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson plan, will not be international but American.

Can there be any doubt as to the kind of decisions which will be made by this so-called international control authority when the matter concerns, for instance, the Soviet Union?

In his interesting book *Fear, War and the Bomb* Professor Blackett points out with perfectly good foundation that the national composition of members of this control agency over the next 10 or 20 years would assure a majority of votes to the course to which the United States would attach special importance.

In order not to go into too much detail we shall merely say that

under such circumstances control of all the world reserves of atomic energy would in fact be concentrated in the hands of the United States Government, that it alone would have undivided sway in this field, that it alone would determine the further line of development of the atomic energy plants, permitting or refusing to permit other countries to produce atomic energy on a scale which the United States Government would consider against its interests.

The very system of control proposed in the Baruch plan, which does not stem from the economic requirements of the various countries but exclusively from strategic considerations, speaks for itself.

Professor Blackett justly says: "It will be remembered that in the Lilienthal Plan the major atomic plants were to be located on strategic grounds, not according to need. How would the number of plants, allocated, say, to America and Russia be determined? If it was according to relative need, America, with her . . . ample supplies of coal and oil, would receive few or none! If the Atomic Development Authority made such a decision, America would certainly repudiate the whole scheme. But allocation on strategic grounds would lead equally to grave injustices. For instance, Russia might find herself allotted the same number of plants as America . . .

"These conditions make it probable that the United States Government would not have proposed a scheme such as the Atomic Development Authority if they had not every confidence that the Western Powers would be assured of a majority on ADA."

As for inspection, it too would be completely under the control of the United States with all the resulting consequences. The so-called "honest profession" of Oatases, of which Mr. Acheson spoke here, would no doubt be greatly encouraged in work of this inspection too, at least with regard to all the countries in which the United States is interested and, naturally, not least of all, with regard to the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies.

Indicating the biggest shortcomings of the Baruch plan, which

render it entirely unacceptable to self-respecting states, it cannot but be pointed out right here that this plan would be disastrous to the development of a peaceful economy, especially of the countries which need atomic energy for civilian purposes. But for all that the Baruch plan is incapable of ensuring real control if one is to believe, for instance, the spokesman of the United States Osborn who declared publicly at the last session that there is not a single member of the Atomic Energy Commission who believes it possible to create a plan excluding the possibility of abuse and the possibility of an atomic war. Osborn acknowledged that in a situation with an international control authority owning and administering plants, potential explosives may, as formerly, get into the hands of a state through seizure if the situation proves practically hopeless.

And here such a plan is being called the best plan that could be framed and for many years already attempts have been made to foist on other states this plan of control which is unsuitable, in reality.

Imposing their plan which, as we see, pursues aims that have nothing in common with international control, they pointed out the necessity of reconciliation with the fact that this plan is directed against the sovereignty of other states. When we objected to such an assertion directed against the state sovereignty of independent countries, we were told that it is unavoidable in the interests of higher aims. These higher aims, however, boil down merely to assuring American monopolies domination in atomic affairs.

Attempts were made to reproach us for our so-called rigorism which, they allege, makes us ready to disregard the fate of millions of people who may become victims of an atomic war if no agreement is reached on atomic control based on the Baruch plan. But we have already said that this plan does not answer the task of establishing effective international control. We have already repeatedly explained our position with regard to sovereignty, pointing out that every international agreement naturally demands certain limitation in this sphere. But it is one thing to limit sovereignty for truly common interests. It is another

to strive to limit and, even more, to completely cancel sovereignty under cover of common interests while really pursuing the interests of one country, in this case of the United States, as is contemplated under the Baruch plan. Such so-called restriction of sovereignty cannot be accepted by a single sensible person.

It is not superfluous to recall that even such an American leader in the field of atomic weapon manufacture as Chester Barnard, former president of the New Jersey Bell Telephone Company, member of the State Department's Board of Consultants on atomic energy control, said in 1946, speaking of the Baruch plan, that in accepting this plan the other countries would gradually and voluntarily have to repudiate considerable elements of their sovereignty before the United States gives up the atomic bomb. Barnard added to this that it was difficult to imagine less favorable conditions for successful negotiations between proud and equal powers. In 1946 it was already clear to him, as he himself declared, that the chances that this American plan would be accepted were very slight.

Speaking of the Soviet proposals regarding international control, Mr. Acheson referred to the remark in the five-power document of 1949 that the Soviet proposal would endanger international security. This of course has no foundation whatever, and we have already refuted this time and again at previous sessions.

There are, however, a number of competent indications pointing out that it is the Baruch plan that really endangers peace, because under it any real or imagined violation of agreement in the opinion of the majority of the control agency could be used to unleash a new world war.

It is a fact that the well-known Bullitt went so far as to consider the Soviet Government's decision to raise production of steel in our country to 60 million tons a year as proof of Soviet aggression. Under the Baruch plan in action, it would not be difficult for Bullitt to push through a corresponding decision in the control agency with all the consequences following from such a decision.

* * *

IN conclusion we would like to ask the authors and advocates of the draft resolution of the "Three" to reply to the following questions:

Do they agree that the General Assembly should proclaim the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition?

Do they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council by February 1, 1952 a draft of a respective convention?

Do they agree that this convention should envisage measures ensuring the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its manufacture and utilization of the already produced atom bombs solely for civilian purposes, and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the above convention?

Do they agree that the General Assembly should recognize that every sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments must include the establishment of an international control agency within the framework of the Security Council?

Do they agree that the task of this agency should be control of the reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces, as well as control to ensure that the decision to prohibit the atomic weapon is strictly and scrupulously observed, and that this international agency should disclose data on all armed forces, including semi-military forces, security forces and police, as well as all armaments, including the atomic weapon, and having also in view effective international inspection carried out by decisions of the above international control agency?

Finally, do they agree that the international agency for control over the prohibition of the atomic weapon should immediately after the conclusion of the convention inspect all the enterprises for the manufacture and storing of atomic weapons with the

object of verifying the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon?

An affirmative reply to all these questions will serve as the genuine and best proof of the willingness to prohibit the atomic weapon and establish genuine international control to ensure the implementation of this decision.

We would be happy, and not only we but all the peace-loving peoples would be happy, if we received an affirmative, clear and exact reply to these questions of ours.

At the same time the reply to these questions will show who should really be held responsible for the rejection of the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control.

The delegation of the USSR believes that the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of the United States, Great Britain and France cannot in its present form serve its declared purpose. This draft resolution requires important amendments which the USSR delegation is presenting simultaneously for the consideration of the First Committee.

We hope that these amendments, which in our view are indisputable, will be adopted and that the way will thus be opened for agreement on such important questions as the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, with the establishment of strict international control to enforce the prohibition of atomic weapons and to ensure real, honest and scrupulous observance of the decision to reduce armaments and armed forces.

Speech in the Political Committee

November 30, 1951

Mr. Chairman, Messrs. Delegates:

WE have already reached the point in our work when it is necessary to summarize certain results, draw conclusions and chart a further path in the solution of the problems facing us.

Under these conditions it is especially important to pick out the main, decisive questions discussed during the general debate. It is important to make new efforts in order to define most fully and clearly one's stand on questions that arouse disputes and differences and to make use of all the opportunities for eliminating the obstacles hindering a proper mutual understanding of these stands. This is all the more essential because in the course of polemics, in the heat of, so to say, verbal battles, a considerable number of all kinds of extraneous layers have been formed, without whose removal it is frequently difficult to find a proper solution of the problem. This means that in summarizing the results and in working on the precise definition of some or other precepts, it is impossible to proceed without removing these layers, without casting aside everything that does not bear a direct relation to these important issues and can merely hamper the attainment of decisions agreed upon, everything that does not facilitate a calm analysis and proper conclusions. This also means that it is necessary to clear the facts from distortions and to restore them to their true, real form and significance, which alone can ensure their proper understanding.

It should be said, however, that the authors of the draft resolution of the "Three" and certain supporters of this draft have frequently disregarded the demand outlined above, although they

have given assurances that they are allegedly striving for attaining an agreed program and are guided solely by the interests of truth, by the interests of the matter. Such assurances can in no way be reconciled with the speeches of certain delegates who have considered it proper to fill their speeches, spiced with considerable doses of malice and slander, with all kinds of fables and banal attacks against us which have long since become tedious. This is unfortunately being repeated at every session, and not infrequently the same tricks are being employed, the same so-called facts are being used, the same quotations are being cited, notwithstanding the fact that such attacks have already been repulsed earlier, the tricks exposed, the false statements refuted, the ignorance of their authors exposed, and the authors themselves put in their place.

Whether one wants it or not, one again has to take up such sallies of these Messrs. delegates. This time too I am forced to dwell on the speech of the former French Minister of the Interior, M. Jules Moch, who, speaking on November 26, piled up a heap of absurd and slanderous allegations regarding the occupation and "annexation by Russia," as he put it, of some kind of territories before the war and at the beginning of the war.

M. Moch stated in his speech that a repetition of tendentious assertions arouses mistrust and that this mistrust, entertained by him and people of a like mind, grows as they acquaint themselves with certain methods of the Soviet regime. He attempted to vilify our methods whose substance allegedly consists in concealing the truth and in other mortal sins. To substantiate this slanderous invention of his, Moch went on to cite a quotation from the work of our great teacher V. I. Lenin, "*Left-Wing*" Communism, an Infantile Disorder. He, of course, doctored it accordingly, tearing out several phrases from the entire context and thus resorting to obvious falsification.

Moch, however, has become a victim of the falsification which the American representative Austin permitted himself to indulge in right here in Paris three years ago. I cannot help but recall that Austin likewise ventured to quote — distorting and mutilating the real text and the meaning of this quotation—"Left-Wing"

Communism, an Infantile Disorder according to the crib prepared for him by the officials of the State Department, who did not understand, and of course did not want honestly to find out, the substance of this question.

Right there and then, three years ago, this base falsification of Mr. Austin was exposed. Right there and then the text was restored to its original form and it was proved that the tactics which "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder* recommends the advanced representatives of workers' parties to employ have in view the circumstances when in the struggle against the labor movement "those gentlemen, the 'leaders' of opportunism, will resort to every trick of bourgeois diplomacy, to the aid of bourgeois governments, the priests, the police and the courts, in order . . . to insult, bait, and persecute" advanced representatives of the working class.

It is pointed out in the corresponding place in "*Left-Wing*" *Communism, an Infantile Disorder* that it is necessary "not to fear difficulties, not to fear the pinpricks, chicanery, insults and persecution by the 'leaders' (who, being opportunists and social-chauvinists, are, in most cases, directly or indirectly connected with the bourgeoisie and the police) . . ." (M. Moch, pay attention — with the police.)

This is what is taught by Marxism-Leninism — this great doctrine, this great invincible banner of the working class, of all working mankind.

It should be recalled that methods of falsifying quotations were resorted to in 1948 by Austin, McNeil and their friends, in order, in addition to everything else, to divert the attention of public opinion from their fabrications and specifically from the fabrication known as "Protocol M," which was needed in order to give the American and British occupation authorities in Western Germany the pretext for raining down repressions on the democratic organizations of Western Germany, going so far as to prohibit the People's Congress, intensify the pressure on trade unions, and so on.

Three years ago Austin gave currency to his falsification out of sympathy for the cares weighing down the German and French

police. This year the former French Minister of the Interior, M. Jules Moch, tried to employ this same trick, evidently prompted by similar aspirations and motives — to support the police measures against advanced representatives of the working class in his country.

My colleague, chairman of the Polish delegation, Werblowski, restoring the truth, has already given Jules Moch a lesson in handling quotations, advising him to read more closely the sources from which he takes quotations. But this perhaps is a difficult task for M. Moch for he evidently in general prefers to use secondhand quotations, not being in the least disturbed by the fact that these quotations are presented in a distorted and falsified way.

With such treatment of facts and documents it is, of course, impossible for the discussion to yield any kind of fruitful results. It is characteristic that M. Moch said nothing else, if one omits his statement to the effect that the United States, Britain and France could effect a reduction of armaments — he used the word — "disarmament," which does not at all correspond to the proposals contained in the draft resolution of the "Three" — only if full guarantees of sincerity were submitted. What these guarantees should consist of M. Moch did not take the pains to state.

Notwithstanding the fact that M. Moch spoke on behalf of the Three — the United States, Great Britain and France — representatives of the United States and Great Britain have taken the floor after him and each one of them has also spoken on behalf of the Three.

In his speech the United States representative, Mr. Jessup, has repeated the attempt to give assurances of the striving of the United States to lessen the tension in international relations and, as he put it, to advance along a peaceful path of negotiations.

It is not the first time that we have heard statements by the delegations of the United States, Great Britain and France about the readiness allegedly to reach agreement with the Soviet Union and assurances of the desire to lower the temperature of the political atmosphere. We have already pointed to the peculiar division of labor in the camp of the Atlantic bloc. On the one hand the representatives of this bloc at the Assembly do not spare words

about peace and cooperation, the need to relieve the tension in international relations, disappointment with the alleged unyieldingness of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, just as responsible, and sometimes even more responsible, representatives of the countries of this bloc deliver incendiary, bellicose speeches, up to the point of directly calling for an attack on the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. No one here will dare to deny these facts. The entire world is confronted with these facts, and let anyone try to deny these facts.

While here in the First Committee Mr. Jessup delivered his pious speech about peace and cooperation, another United States representative, the well-known John Foster Dulles, adviser of the State Department and one of the main moving spirits of American foreign policy, on his part made a speech of a directly opposite nature at the annual dinner of the Advertising Council in Detroit. *The New York Herald Tribune* reports that in this speech Dulles called for the creation of a striking force of great power distributed in convenient places along the Soviet perimeter which, according to Dulles, is more essential than defensive forces for every nation allegedly threatened by Russia. In this speech Dulles declared that next year the United States would spend about 60 billion dollars on rearmament. He added: "We dare not consider that this present effort will do the job once and for all or that we can predetermine the year of greatest danger. The year of greatest danger will be the year we relax. We shall have to find a policy that can be sustained for many years without relaxing." To relax means to halt the armaments drive; it means to reduce, to cut — if not altogether to discontinue — the preparation for another war. It is this relaxing that, according to Mr. Dulles, represents the greatest danger.

Mr. Jessup said it was necessary to compare the speech of the Secretary of State Mr. Acheson with the speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinsky both in substance and in spirit to perceive the aspirations of both sides. But would it not be better to compare Mr. Jessup's speech with the speech of John Foster Dulles to perceive the real direction of the foreign policy of the United States, to perceive where the reactionary

forces in the United States are really driving matters, what they are counting upon? At last Mr. Dulles has decided to admit openly that the United States, which heads the aggressive Atlantic bloc, is preparing not for defense, but for attack, that a striking force of great power distributed in convenient places along the perimeter of the USSR is being created and that this is more important and essential than defensive forces. Is it not clear that Mr. Dulles has at last dotted the i's, giving fresh proof of the aggressive nature of the foreign policy of the United States?

Can this fact be ignored while listening to the honeyed speeches of the American representatives at the Assembly? And does the revelation of Dulles, official representative of the State Department, mean anything, is it not worthy of notice and does it not cause the necessity of being even more on the alert after these speeches than was necessary before?

If our speeches are to be compared for their "substance and spirit," then while making this comparison it is absolutely necessary to add to the speeches of Acheson and Jessup the speech of Dulles, who in the same speech has also justified the unparalleled violation of international law and international agreements committed by the American Congress when it adopted the Mutual Security Act of October 10, 1951, with Kersten's amendment appropriating 100 million dollars for financing the subversive and terrorist activity of its agents against the USSR and the People's Democracies.

* * * *

THE United States representative Mr. Jessup has attempted to adduce some arguments in support of the draft of the Three. He has undertaken this to prove that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France proposed to the representative of the Soviet Union here in Paris that the four Foreign Ministers meet and discuss questions which could facilitate the relieving of international tension. Mr. Jessup said here that they proposed that the agenda of such a meeting include an item under the heading: Existing levels of armaments and armed forces and the measures to be adopted jointly by the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France for the international control and re-

duction of armed forces and armaments. Jessup said that the meeting was not held and that the three Powers — France, the United States and Great Britain — decided to devote their efforts to preparing a sound, progressive, as he said here, proposal for disarmament to be submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly.

Mr. Jessup's memory, however, is failing him. It was not the representative of the United States but the representative of the USSR at the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris who proposed to include on the agenda the question of the immediate commencement of the reduction of armed forces of the four Powers: the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France. As for the representative of the United States, incidentally, this was the very same Mr. Jessup, he came out with objections to including this item on the agenda. And the United States delegate, supported by the representatives of Great Britain and France, adhered to this stand until the very end of the conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers.

We may be told that the question of the reduction of armaments demanded the preliminary solution of the question of the level of armed forces. But the precise point is that by insisting on discussing the level of armed forces the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France thus tried to evade the question of the reduction of armed forces.

Why, it is not fortuitous that at one meeting of the Deputy Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris the French representative Parodi said that the French Government considers it necessary to exert certain *efforts in the sphere of armaments* and precisely *for this reason* France could not agree to the draft agenda containing a formulation about the reduction of armed forces of the four Powers.

The representatives of the United States and Great Britain adhered to a similar stand and they categorically rejected the proposal of the Soviet Union to include on the agenda the question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces, including the armaments and armed forces of the USSR, the United States, Great Britain and France. The representatives

of these three Powers stubbornly insisted on including, instead of this, an item about the existing level of armaments.

It is sufficient to ponder over this formulation to become convinced how far from the truth is Mr. Jessup's allegation that at the conference held in Paris from March to June 1951 the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and Great Britain proposed to discuss the question of the reduction of armed forces. No, they did not propose this. The representative of Great Britain, Davies, defending the formulation of the "Three" concerning the level of armed forces, stated that it was still not known in which direction the question of armaments should be solved: in the direction of their reduction or, on the contrary, of their increase. Even at that time Davies already explained that the control mentioned in the proposals of the three Powers should be understood not as control over the reduction of armaments but as control over their level.

Compare, on the one hand, these two pronouncements of Mr. Davies; on the other hand, compare the statements made by Davies with the pronouncement of Parodi, who at that time represented France at that conference, and you will see what this formula—the question of the existing level of armed forces—means and whether it resembles the proposal for the reduction of armed forces.

I will say to this directly: it does not resemble it because, as we shall further see, the "level of armed forces" is not a "reduction of armed forces." This level may mean, as Mr. Davies said at that time, either an increase or a reduction, and for this reason he objected to including on the agenda the question of the reduction of armaments.

This is the history which is now being repeated here.¹ This is what Mr. Acheson said. These are two sides of one and the same coin: the armaments which they are taking up in Rome and the "disarmament," to use their language, which they are taking up in Paris. They want to reconcile these two tasks. But, gentlemen, we are sufficiently experienced political leaders to understand that these two tasks are irreconcilable, that

only an impasse can be created by trying simultaneously to arm with one hand and "to disarm" with the other hand. .

Now Mr. Jessup states that the draft resolution of the "Three" about the so-called arms reduction is a continuation of the line pursued by the United States, Great Britain and France at the Paris Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers. This is indeed the case, but this means that the present draft of the resolution of the "Three" is just as far removed from the task of reducing armaments and armed forces as the stand the three Powers took at the Paris Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers. And there this stand meant: no talk whatever or, if you wish, nothing but talk about arms reduction, but no reduction of armaments whatever; it is necessary, they said, first to determine the level of armed forces, and only then would it be clear whether to reduce arms or to arm.

But judging from everything that Mr. Jessup said further on about the relative size of armed forces and armaments of the Soviet Union—of which I shall speak further—there could be no talk whatever about a reduction of armaments because the American, British and French delegations and those supporting them are now making every effort to prove that the existing level of armaments is such that if anyone should reduce armed forces and armaments, it should be only the Soviet Union.

Consequently they already say in advance that they will not reduce anything. All the more, they will not reduce by one-third.

I shall dwell more on this aspect of the matter further on but will now limit myself to what I have said, believing that this is quite sufficient to re-establish the real state of affairs and show the bankruptcy of the statements made by the United States delegate that at the Paris Conference the United States, Great Britain and France allegedly defended the need for reducing armaments and armed forces. They not only did not defend such a need but fought against the recognition of such a need. They would not agree to include such an item on the

agenda of the Foreign Ministers Council for which the four deputy ministers were to prepare an appropriate agenda.

Therefore Mr. Jessup's statement regarding the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers is seriously at variance with the truth. Just as far removed from the truth are Mr. Jessup's as well as Mr. Lloyd's disquisitions on a number of other questions: on the size of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States, aggression in Korea, proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons, on the Information Bureau, and so on and so forth.

Everything that has been said here by Messrs. Jessup and Lloyd on the above questions can only be explained by their desire to divert attention from the principal important issues demanding serious attention and to draw us into a discussion of those questions which have no direct relation to the matter and can only complicate the situation in our committee and heat up the political atmosphere, as has been said here.

I do not consider it necessary to dwell on all these questions but will touch only on some. First of all I shall deal with Mr. Lloyd's allegation that the Soviet Union has not introduced a single constructive proposal on the question of aid to underdeveloped countries. In this connection I should like to recall, for instance, the fact that at the previous session of the General Assembly, during the discussion of the 20-year program for attaining peace through the United Nations, the delegation of the USSR submitted a perfectly constructive proposal that in the further elaboration of this program provision be made: "To render technical aid to economically backward countries, if not exclusively, then at least mainly, through the United Nations. In doing so, to proceed from the fact that such aid must be directed toward promoting the development of the internal resources of the economically backward countries, of their national industry and agriculture, toward strengthening their economic independence, and should not be made conditional upon demands for political, economic or military privileges for the countries rendering such aid."

It should be added that the delegation of Great Britain

voted against this proposal. And this notwithstanding the fact that an analogous proposal submitted on the initiative of the Soviet Union was adopted by the Economic and Social Council in 1949. Moreover, last year the Soviet Union also submitted a proposal that the General Assembly recognize that the development of international trade must be effected without discrimination, on the basis of equality and respect for the sovereignty of all countries and without interference in the internal affairs of other states.

It was no one else but Younger, then representing Great Britain, who declared that this proposal of ours was "Soviet propaganda." Moreover, Younger stated that the British delegation, perceiving insincerity behind the intentions of the USSR in this proposal, would vote against it. The British delegation did vote against this proposal.

Mr. Lloyd preferred to keep silent about all this. But this is exactly how matters stood. It turns out that the Soviet delegation introduces constructive proposals of which Mr. Lloyd speaks, and the British delegation rejects them.

The above proposals clearly express our policy. Great Britain's policy is clearly expressed in her attitude toward these proposals, as well as in the well-known way in which British monopolies treat underdeveloped countries and in the activities of such monopolies as, for example, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This is how matters stand, Mr. Lloyd, as regards constructive proposals.

As for the participation or non-participation of the USSR in various international organizations of which Mr. Lloyd has likewise spoken, first of all it is necessary to consider what these organizations represent. There is, for example, the International Refugee Organization. Instead of facilitating the repatriation of refugees, this organization has become an office for hiring and supplying plantation owners with cheap contracted labor, for recruiting traitors as mercenaries and organizing armed groups for subversive activity and sabotage within the USSR and the People's Democracies. It is for the encouragement of this criminal activity, for direct participa-

tion, I would say, in this criminal activity that the United States has now decided to appropriate 100 million dollars.

As for the international trade organization, at the Fifth Session of the General Assembly we already stated that the Charter of this organization does not correspond to the interests of many countries and that if the necessary amendments were introduced into the Charter the USSR might be able to join it. This statement, however, has had no effect so far. The USSR takes an active part in international organizations that are meritorious—for example in the World Meteorological Organization, the Universal Postal Union and others.

This seems sufficient to reveal the reverse side of the statements made here last time by Mr. Lloyd.

I would also like to dwell on the statement of Mr. Jessup regarding the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. Jessup spoke here at length about the armed forces of the USSR and countries friendly to the USSR. He tried to compare the numerical strength of the armed forces of the USSR and the United States, stating in particular that the armed forces of the United States did not exceed 1,500,000 men by 1950. In doing so Jessup however preferred to keep silent about the fact that in his April message to Congress the President of the United States had already pointed out that in the past 10 months the United States had more than doubled its armed forces and that they would be brought up to 3,500,000 men, not counting the 2,000,000 men in different military reserve formations and national guard units, and this without the armed forces of Great Britain, France, Italy and other countries which are members of the Atlantic bloc. Turkey alone, it seems, is preparing to put up an army of 400,000 men if she is at last finally accepted by the Atlantic bloc. If all these numbers are added up, if account is taken of the American and British navies, the American military bases, the American stocks of atom bombs accumulated during these years under cover of talks about international control, it should become clear to anyone that Jessup's arithmetical

operation does not in reality correspond to the figures which he manipulated. As for the numerical strength of the armed forces of the Soviet Union, as I have already pointed out in my speech at the General Assembly, it is half of the numerical strength of the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain and France.

If you want to know exactly, please sign the agreement which we propose for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, prohibition of the atomic weapon and establishment of international control—and we will lay all the figures on the table, even to the last machine gun, to the last soldier, and then you will see what our armed forces are like and whether your judgment is right. Now, however, it is too early to speak of this for two reasons: firstly, because you display a remarkable knowledge of our armed forces—the result of the work by the representatives of these countries in the Soviet Union in the diplomatic sphere—and secondly, you maintain that this precisely corresponds to the fact. Hence the task is solved.

We do not want to disappoint you one way or another.

And so let us sign the agreement right here at this very same table; let us sit down and lay on the table, we, all our figures; and you, your figures.

And in face of such facts we are told here that the proposal of the USSR for reduction of the armed forces of the five Great Powers by one-third will allegedly create some kind of an advantage for the Soviet Union, and objections are raised against this proposal. But what do they put up against our proposal? This can be seen from the third point of the draft resolution of the "Three." They propose:

1. To instruct the commission to draw up proposals which will be incorporated in the draft treaty on the balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments.
2. This reduction of armed forces and armaments should be brought to a level sufficient for defense.
3. The system of this "disarmament" should include progressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis,

covering all types of armaments, including also the atomic weapon.

4. The verification should be based on effective international inspection.

5. As regards the atomic weapon, they again put forth the Baruch plan, which allegedly envisages the establishment of international control over atomic energy and allegedly can ensure the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

It should be noted that the main point in these proposals is the establishment of the level sufficient for defense and the so-called progressive disclosure and verification, or, as Mr. Acheson said, "disclosure and verification by stages."

As for the "level of the armed forces" this is an old acquaintance of ours. This is that very same level of armed forces which was so zealously advocated at the Paris Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France, who counterpoised the level of armaments and armed forces to the reduction of armaments and armed forces.

Here again the question arises as to what is to serve as a criterion for establishing this level. Mr. Acheson tried to give an answer to this question. But, honestly speaking, he could not produce any sort of a serious and comprehensible answer. He said, for example, that a "great country has a great many people and therefore can afford and will have a greater army than another country." But right there and then he added that still it would be necessary to impose — I am citing Mr. Acheson — a flat limitation beyond which no country is permitted to go no matter how great it is, irrespective of what it can do, irrespective of how vast, according to its words — this remark of Mr. Acheson is very strange — its territory is, how numerous its population is and how many problems it has. So what do we get? It is proposed to establish as a criterion a level depending on the size of the country, its population, and so on, but it is said, nevertheless, that no matter how big the country is, we will limit it to a certain number which evidently will not be in proportion either to its

area, length of frontiers, size of its population or other political conditions which, for example, consist of whether it is separated from other countries by an ocean 3,000 miles wide, whether its immediate neighbors are friendly or, on the contrary, hostile states, and so on and so forth. Irrespective of all this—although this country is larger, although all factors requiring that it be given a bigger army are on hand—we will not give it a bigger army; we will limit it.

It is clear that with such a reservation concerning strict limitation, the entire meaning of this so-called criterion is lost, the entire meaning of defining the level of the armed forces of which the draft resolution of the "Three" speaks is lost. But no less important is the fact that the very definition of the level of the armed forces sufficient for defense, according to the draft of the "Three," should be assigned to the commission which will itself have the right to decide whether the given number of armed forces is needed or not by one state or another for its defense. It means that for the defense of my State someone else, not reckoning with us, with our demands, opinion and position, will define the number of the armed forces which we will be graciously permitted to have. Of course, irrespective of how this matter will be regarded by the country concerned, this commission will simply tell each state what quantity of armaments and what armed forces it is allowed to have and what resources it can use for these purposes. And this Mr. Acheson called in his speech "a mutually agreed upon program."

Can this entire scheme of defining the level of the armed forces sufficient for defense be considered really serious, especially if account is taken of the fact that the commission itself and all its measures have to be carried out in conformity with the well-known Acheson-Baruch plan, according to which the so-called international control agency can only be, and will be, nothing more than an American control agency, that is, an agency whose personnel will consist of people able to carry through the line of the United States in settling all questions of foreign policy?

As for "progressive disclosure and verification" or "revealing and verification by stages," to use Acheson's terminology, I will merely say that this measure borrowed from the Baruch plan cannot facilitate the solution of the task.

Even in the American press sober voices are heard warning against such a method of so-called reduction of armaments and armed forces. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle of a census of armaments by stages was one of the biggest obstacles to attaining control over atomic energy. And this is true; similarly true also is the remark of certain organs of the American press that because this principle was politically unfeasible from the very outset, it has become an anachronism. After the American monopoly of the atomic weapon was destroyed, after Russia made the first explosion of the atom bomb, it should have become clear that the Russians already had the necessary information. For this and for other weighty reasons the principle of stages should have been abandoned, the American press states.

"The system of stages" is a dead formula.

But the authors of the draft resolution of the "Three" continue to insist on their dead formulas, although they try to present them as the very latest method for solving questions that interest us. This method borrowed from the Baruch plan is not only old but also unsuitable, and herein lies its main shortcoming. This shortcoming fatally stamps the entire draft resolution of the "Three," from which these "stages" or this "progressive disclosure" should be eliminated.

Mr. Lloyd tries to prove that the so-called United Nations plan, or more correctly speaking, the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, envisages prohibition of the atomic weapon.

Wherein does he perceive such a prohibition? Let us look at the draft resolution of the "Three." In the draft resolution this matter is mentioned three times — in the preamble, point 3A and in point 3D. The preamble merely contains a reference to effective international control over atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the utilization of atomic energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. Thus this is

a mere statement of the *aim* to be kept in mind when drawing up the plans outlined in the preamble. But to point out the aim, such as the prohibition of atomic weapons, does not yet mean prohibiting atomic weapons. Therefore the preamble consists of empty words binding no one to do anything. It merely states the aim, the task—to prohibit—but it is not prohibition at all. Therefore the actual prohibition is being put off. It is not declared at all. We are not being asked to adopt a decision prohibiting the atomic weapon now. And this is where it differs from our proposals, for we propose clearly and simply that a decision to prohibit atomic weapons and establish international control be adopted right now, right here, at this session of the General Assembly. And the practical measures should be set forth in the convention to be drawn up by February 1, 1952, and so on and so forth.

There is a big difference between the two formulations of the question.

Therefore, all we have in the preamble is the *statement of the aim* which should be kept in mind while drawing up the plans mentioned in the preamble, but we do not have the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Point 3A instructs the disarmament commission to draw up proposals which will be incorporated in the draft treaty on the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and all armaments. Further on it mentions the principles by which the commission should be guided, and these include the principles requiring the establishment of effective international control ensuring the prohibition of atomic weapons. Point 3D indicates that in formulating the proposals for the above-mentioned treaty, the United Nations plan for control over atomic energy, *i.e.*, the previously mentioned Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, should be taken as a basis.

And we are being told that all this stands for the prohibition of the atomic weapon although, of course, it is perfectly clear to everyone that the prohibition of the atomic weapon is not in question at all.

It is impossible for anyone who is truthful and unbiased to

deny that not a single one of the above-enumerated items contains a proposal which could be regarded as a declaration of the prohibition of atomic weapons, *as prohibition of atomic weapons*.

Unable to oppose anything to the indisputable fact that the draft resolution of the "Three" does not contain prohibition of the atomic weapon, provided one does not confuse *aim*, encouragement, desire, instruction to draw up a proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons with actual *prohibition* of atomic weapons, Lloyd, speaking of our proposal, tries to depict the matter as if we want every state to declare that it will discontinue the manufacture of atomic bombs and destroy those already manufactured, and he adds that the Soviet Union evidently holds that in this manner prohibition will be achieved.

But where did Mr. Lloyd get all this, we would like to ask, on what basis does he attribute to the Soviet Union something we never said? On what basis does he do this when he has before him our amendments and, in particular, our amendment to the first point of the operative part of the three-power draft which contains nothing resembling what Mr. Lloyd ascribes to us here?

I am, therefore, compelled to call to mind the text of our proposal on this matter hoping that you will immediately perceive the enormous difference between Lloyd's statement and ours.

Here is the text of our proposal:

"The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of people to be contrary to the conscience and honor of the peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations, declares the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition."

This is far removed from what Mr. Lloyd said here. It is not each state which proclaims something or other, but the Assembly which does the proclaiming. And it does not proclaim that we will no longer manufacture bombs and destroy those already manufactured, but something entirely different. And

that there may be no doubt that the matter is not so simple as perhaps Mr. Lloyd would have liked to depict it when he spoke of our proposals, I will cite the second paragraph of this proposal:

"The General Assembly instructs the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare and submit by February 1, 1952 for consideration of the Security Council a draft convention envisaging measures that ensure fulfillment of the decisions of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its production and the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs already produced, and on the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the above convention."

This is our proposal and it does not in the least resemble what Mr. Lloyd, falsifying our proposal, said here—may he forgive me for the frank expression—falsifying.

And we submit this as the first point of the draft resolution.

Of course, it is possible to say: "We will not accept it." But then it is necessary to say: "We do not desire to prohibit the atomic weapon." Or it is possible to say: "We want to prohibit the atomic weapon." But in that case why not accept our proposal? Without equivocation, without ambiguity, without reservations!

Just think how the whole world will react if we leave this hall at some moment exclaiming: "*The atomic bomb has been prohibited!*"

Do you want this? Then say so.

You will not say so? Then that means you do not want it.

There can be no two positions here, and reconciliation between these two opposite stands is also impossible. And no verbal evasions, no legal subterfuges will help anyone hide the truth from the anxious eyes of the millions upon millions of people throughout the world who desperately long to hear the sacred words emerge from these walls announcing the prohibition of the atom bomb, the unconditional prohibition of the atom bomb, destruction of all atom bombs, establishment of control, drawing up of a convention where all this is said, and, after the convention shall

have been signed, the immediate verification of all atomic establishments, as we propose.

This is our proposal and of course Mr. Lloyd has read it. All the more surprising that he set forth our proposal in such a distorted form. Indeed, is Lloyd's assertion true that according to our proposal it is sufficient for every state to announce that it is discontinuing the manufacture of the atomic weapon when our proposal clearly says that the General Assembly declares the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control? Does Mr. Lloyd not understand that our proposal does not restrict itself merely to a decision of the General Assembly announcing the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control, moreover *strict* international control at that? Does he not see, reading the text of our proposal, that under it the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission must prepare and submit by February 1, 1952 a draft convention envisaging measures that ensure the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions to prohibit the atomic weapon, to establish international control and a number of other measures indicated in the second paragraph of our proposal quoted above?

Thus Mr. Lloyd imputes to us what we do not propose, representing it as our so-called proposal, and he keeps silent about what we really propose.

In reality, I repeat, we propose that the General Assembly declare the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon, that an appropriate convention be drawn up, that this convention envisage measures ensuring the observance of the General Assembly's decisions on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, measures for the discontinuation of the production of atom bombs, utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs already produced and measures for the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this convention.

And we are told: Every state announces that it is discontinuing the manufacture of atom bombs and destroying those already manufactured, and it is thus that prohibition of the atomic weapon will be achieved. This is a caricature. This is a farce. But we are

not in the mood for farces or for jokes. We want to discuss seriously a serious matter and to make serious decisions.

* * * *

I SHALL proceed to Mr. Lloyd's replies to our questions:

1. We asked the authors of the resolution of the "Three" if they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare and submit to the Security Council by a definite date—we named the date—February 1, 1952—a draft convention envisaging the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition.

Instead of replying to this question Lloyd declared that the draft resolution of the "Three" envisages that the commission should draw up proposals for the draft treaty or treaties on the given matter, as he expressed it, on the basis of the United Nations plan, more correctly speaking, on the basis of the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan. But it is known that this plan does not envisage prohibition of the atomic weapon, just as it does not envisage strict international control, of which we spoke above.

Thus, by taking the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan for a basis, Lloyd and his colleagues in the draft resolution of the "Three" refuse to make provision for the prohibition of the atomic weapon in the convention to be completed by February 1, 1952. Insisting that the Baruch plan for the atomic weapon be taken as the basis, Mr. Lloyd in substance rejects our proposal, being fully aware that the Baruch plan is unacceptable to us, and not only to us, but also to a number of other states; being fully aware that the Baruch plan does not provide for the prohibition of the atomic weapon but postpones the settlement of this question to some later stage; knowing well that on this basis we cannot reach an agreement; also knowing well that the so-called international control agency envisaged in the Baruch plan has nothing in common with real international control. For this reason we have the right to state that the representatives of the three Powers, on whose behalf Mr.

Lloyd spoke here—Great Britain, the United States and France—have given a negative answer to our second question.

2. In his reply to our third question Mr. Lloyd maintains that the draft resolution of the "Three" goes farther than the proposals envisaged in the Soviet amendment, which speak of measures that ensure fulfillment of the decisions of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, prohibition of its manufacture, utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs already produced, and measures for establishing control over the implementation of the convention.

Instead of replying to our question Mr. Lloyd again refers to the Baruch plan, presenting matters as though this plan really provides for prohibition of the manufacture of atomic weapons and an effective international control. We have already pointed out that neither one nor the other is provided for in the Baruch plan.

As for placing all atomic raw material and all facilities for its production under the authority of the so-called international control agency, about which Mr. Lloyd spoke in his reply, this proposal, as already pointed out in the past, is utterly unacceptable, because all stocks of atomic raw material and all plants for the production of atomic energy, as well as enterprises in allied industries—metallurgical, engineering, electric power, chemical, and so on and so forth—are to be placed under the authority of this so-called international agency or in its possession, which, essentially speaking, is what is intended. This would mean turning over to the so-called international control agency, which according to the schemes of the supporters of the Baruch plan should in substance be an agency of the American monopolists, all power over the economic life of each country which has atomic raw material and can produce atomic energy.

3. Replying to our fourth question, Lloyd said that the three Powers agree that the General Assembly should recognize that any sincere plan for the substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments must include the establishment

of an international control agency. He, however, has not directly replied to the question put by us, asserting that whether the international control agency is to be within the framework of the Security Council or not would depend on the terms of the agreement. He has explained that if the phrase "within the framework of the Security Council" is understood to mean that the operation of the system of control would be made fully dependent upon the so-called right of "veto," this would beyond doubt be unacceptable to the Governments of the three Powers.

Such a reply from Mr. Lloyd could only arouse extreme surprise. Indeed, Mr. Lloyd most likely knows that in the resolution of the General Assembly of December 14, 1946, adopted at the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly, it was decided that the international control agency would operate *within the framework of the Security Council*.

Was this decided or not? It was decided. Is this recorded anywhere? It is recorded. Is this recorded in the decisions of the second part of the First Session of the General Assembly? It is recorded in the minutes, and you can read it.

That is why Mr. Lloyd's remark as to whether this control agency will be within the framework of the Security Council or not proves that the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France do not wish to take into consideration the decisions of the General Assembly for which they themselves voted in the past and which carry their signatures. If this question is already settled—and it is already settled—why then raise this question? This can be done only with one objective—to warn in advance that it will not be taken into consideration.

And this is already becoming a practice. There was, for example, a gentlemen's agreement regarding the elections to the Security Council, under which definite geographical areas nominated their candidates: the Latin American countries nominated their candidate; countries of Eastern Europe, their candidate; and now the American representatives are nominating Greece instead of Byelorussia, and when they are reminded that there was such a gentlemen's agreement, they allege that it was concluded

in 1946 for one term and has now become invalid. Where do they get this from? I do not exclude the possibility that they will tell me: "What was decided then, *i.e.*, that the international control agency should be within the framework of the Security Council, was decided only for one term and now we are free." And now preparation for such a, shall we say, retraction is apparently being made by the British delegation and by the American delegation and by the French delegation.

In essence there can be no question here as to whether the international control agency will or will not be within the framework of the Security Council. It must be within the framework of the Security Council as it has already been recorded in the General Assembly's decision of December 14, 1946. Had I wished to raise additional questions, then I would have raised the question in this respect too, and perhaps we will discuss it at some future time, namely: Do or do not the Governments of Great Britain, the United States and France intend to carry out the General Assembly's decisions of December 14, 1946, or is it not binding, in their opinion, because it was established for one term only?

Just as puzzling are Mr. Lloyd's remarks concerning the "veto." Without going into details I will merely call to mind that as far back as the First Session of the General Assembly the head of the Soviet Delegation V. M. Molotov stated with regard to this question that ". . . the question of the unanimity principle, which we all know and which operates in the Security Council, has nothing to do with the work of the control commissions themselves" and that "accordingly it is quite wrong to represent the matter as if any state commanding the right of 'veto' would be in a position to prevent the implementation of control and inspection. The control commissions are not the Security Council. And, therefore, there are no grounds for saying that by availing itself of the 'right of veto' any state will be in a position to prevent the implementation of control. . . .

"That is why talk about the 'veto' in connection with control and inspection has no basis whatsoever. Such talk can be interpreted in no other way than as a desire to replace one question

by another, as attempts to evade giving a direct reply to the question at issue—that of the general reduction of armaments."

We see that now, five years later, the same attempts are being repeated. I shall also call to mind that at the Paris Session of the General Assembly in 1948 I too had to refer to this matter and to declare that ". . . the question of the so-called 'veto' is altogether incorrectly interpreted in relation to the work of the international control agency. Of course the right of 'veto' belongs to the Security Council . . .

"But this is a different matter and the point at issue here is that no one, at least as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, ever proposed nor does anyone now propose the application of the right of 'veto' in the work of the control agencies . . .

". . . We say clearly and explicitly: the international control agency must not have the right of 'veto,' the Security Council must have the 'veto' right. Therefore no one dares allege that we want to include the right of 'veto' in the international control agency. . . ."

In accordance with this principled stand of the Soviet Union on the "veto" question, at the Third Session in 1948 the Soviet Union voted for the proposal submitted by the Polish delegation which said "that it will not be necessary that all the representatives of the permanent member states of the Security Council vote affirmatively when the international control agency adopts decisions with regard to verification and inspection on its part."

This was a clear reply to the question of the non-application of the "veto" in the international control agency. But through the efforts of the delegations of the United States, Great Britain and France this proposal was rejected. Evidently their plan excluded the adoption of a proposal fully clarifying the question of the voting procedure in the international control agency and underscoring the non-application in the latter of the right of the so-called "veto."

4. As to the question of whether the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France agree that immediately after the conclusion of the convention the international atomic weapon control agency should inspect all the enterprises for

the manufacture and storing of atomic weapons with the object of verifying the implementation of the convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon—Mr. Lloyd made no reply to this either. Instead of replying to this plain question, he preferred to state that inspection is needed. But this is another question. This is not what we asked; we asked whether they would agree to inspection of all the plants for the manufacture and storing of the atomic weapon *immediately* after the conclusion of a convention. No answer was given to this question.

Nor can one ignore the fact that Mr. Lloyd particularly stressed that inspection should be carried out in conformity with successive stages. In other words, the inspection of atomic plants will not be carried out immediately after the signing of the convention if matters do not reach the stage assigned to the atomic weapon. Thus, it is clear from Mr. Lloyd's answer that the United States, Great Britain and France do not agree with our proposal for the immediate inspection of all atomic plants as soon as the convention we propose is signed.

5. Lastly, it is necessary to turn to Mr. Lloyd's answer to our first question: "Do the United States, Great Britain and France agree that the General Assembly should declare the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition?"

Mr. Lloyd, as we have heard, replied to this question by stating that the adoption by the General Assembly of a tripartite draft resolution would constitute a clear declaration in favor of the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon effected through strict international control.

The draft resolution of the "Three," which we all read and whose text we all know well, does not contain any declaration by the General Assembly of the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition. Therefore, reference to a tripartite draft resolution whose adoption, according to Lloyd, would constitute a declaration of the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon effected through strict international con-

trol does not correspond to what the draft resolution of the "Three" proposes.

It is clear that this time, too, Mr. Lloyd evaded giving a direct answer to our question.

It is likewise clear that a direct answer to our question is our proposal to include in the draft resolution a point with the following content:

"The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of people to be contrary to the conscience and honor of the peoples and incompatible with membership in the United Nations, declares the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of this prohibition."

"The General Assembly instructs the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare and submit by February 1, 1952 for the consideration of the Security Council a draft convention envisaging measures that ensure fulfillment of the decisions of the General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its production and the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs already produced and on the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the above convention."

I stress what I have already said here, but I feel it necessary to repeat it because of the importance of this matter which concerns a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of people.

Here is a clearcut, precise, unequivocal, absolutely definite and determined proposal for the genuine prohibition of the atomic weapon in the name of the General Assembly.

Is it not evident that precisely this proposal is a perfectly clear and definite proposal for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon, with all the ensuing consequences, and with the simultaneous establishment of international control to ensure the implementation of this prohibition?

* * *

SUCH is our stand with regard to the replies of Mr. Lloyd who spoke here on behalf of the three Powers and, consequently, our stand with regard to the replies of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France.

It follows from the above that in its present form the three-power draft resolution does not provide the conditions necessary for carrying out the task confronting us—to prohibit the atomic weapon and reduce armaments and armed forces and to establish strict international control. From the above the path the Soviet Union proposes for carrying out this task is also evident. This path is through the elimination of the above-mentioned serious shortcomings from the draft resolution submitted by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France; this path is through the inclusion of amendments in the draft that would ensure the successful accomplishment of the important task raised before the General Assembly of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, reduction of armaments and armed forces and establishment of strict international control.

The USSR delegation takes cognizance of the fact that the situation which has arisen with regard to this question is characterized by considerable divergences in the position of the Soviet Union on the one hand, and that of the United States, Britain and France on the other. We are willing, however, to continue our efforts and to take part in the work of the proposed sub-committee. The delegation of the Soviet Union is confident that the amendments it has submitted can facilitate the successful accomplishment of the task confronting us for the good of the peoples who yearn for world peace.

Speech in the Political Committee

December 12, 1951

Mr. President, Messrs. Delegates:

IN the opinion of the delegation of the USSR the work of the Subcommittee has yielded certain positive results. It has helped to establish precisely the stand of each of the four delegations, to define more clearly their aspirations and the aims they have set themselves, and it has eliminated certain differences, although these are of relatively minor importance. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation holds that this is the strong aspect of the Subcommittee's work and that it would be incorrect not to mention this positive side of the Subcommittee's work, just as it would be equally incorrect to overestimate the importance of the work accomplished by the Subcommittee, inasmuch as, in substance, unsolved differences remained dividing the USSR, on the one hand, and the United States, Great Britain and France, on the other hand, on very important questions whose solution is expected of us — this may be said without fear of exaggeration — by the peoples of the entire world. Herein lies the weak aspect of the work accomplished by the Subcommittee. But what the Subcommittee has been unable to do must be done by the Committee of Twelve, the Political Committee, the General Assembly, the entire United Nations.

Our paramount task consists precisely in overcoming and eliminating the differences on major questions and, in any case, in raising these questions to their full stature, as merited by their import and significance. That is why the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to dwell precisely on these questions without trying to cover everything that was under consideration by the Subcom-

mittee, but believing itself bound to speak about things of prime importance.

I shall start with Paragraph 2 of the memorandum dealing with common aims. The memorandum states that both the proposals—in question are the proposals outlined in the draft resolution of the three States, the United States, Great Britain and France, and the amendments of the Soviet delegation—coincide with regard to certain common aims which they strive to attain. As proof, the memorandum points out that the USSR delegation has agreed to the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution of the "Three," which says that the General Assembly desires "to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new energies and resources for positive programs of reconstruction and development."

Subscribing to this formula, the Soviet Union has been fully aware of its significance, has been fully aware of the responsibility placed on it by such an important commitment as that indicated above—to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and to liberate new energies and resources for positive work of reconstruction and development.

This is an important commitment. From this there must inevitably follow corresponding conclusions pertaining also to the entire foreign policy of each state accepting this formula. The delegation of the USSR and — I am convinced of this — the delegations of all countries sincerely assuming this commitment and ready consistently and resolutely to implement it are confronted with a number of tasks which would facilitate the development of this noble aim set forth above and ensure the possibility of attaining it.

There can be no contradiction between this aim and the methods which would ensure its attainment. If contradiction arises here, this can only mean that the methods prove to be unsuitable for the attainment of the above aim and, consequently, other methods must be chosen.

In assuming the commitment of lifting from the peoples of the world the burden of increasing armaments and fear of war,

as it is stated in the first paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution of the "Three," one must ask oneself: How can this task be carried out—the task of lifting from the peoples the burden of armaments, especially of increasing armaments? How can one lift from the peoples the fear of war? How can one liberate new energies and resources for the reconstruction and development of countries? Naturally it also follows that by leaving these questions unanswered or by giving ambiguous or, moreover, incorrect replies to these questions, matters cannot be advanced even one millimeter.

But to give a correct answer to the above question one must look around oneself, see what is happening in the world, where armaments and the burden they impose on peoples are growing more and more. What is this caused by? What causes are giving rise to these phenomena? And what means can and must be employed for eliminating these phenomena?

We shall not start now to present facts abundantly cited here earlier which sufficiently explain this question. We consider it necessary merely to recall that the three Governments that submitted their draft resolution have at their disposal absolutely no facts, no data, and consequently no grounds whatever that could justify the attempts they are making to deny that they and their Atlantic bloc allies are engaged in their countries in a frenzied armaments drive and, moreover, on a constantly increasing scale. Such a situation, of course, must inevitably place a heavy burden on the population of these countries and so cannot facilitate the easing of this burden to any degree. On the other hand, they do not have any facts, any data whatever, and, because of this, no grounds whatever, to present matters as though such an armaments drive is under way in the Soviet Union and in the countries friendly to it. Were it necessary again to refer to facts, many of them could be cited, for even during the time which has passed since the beginning of the Subcommittee's work and up to its conclusion and resumption of the work by the First Committee, many new facts have accumulated which indisputably confirm the above assertions.

This makes it easy to decide who can and who must bear responsibility for the situation that has arisen.

The first paragraph of the preamble is of great importance. The first conclusion which should be drawn from the statement it contains is the duty of taking effective measures for stopping the armaments drive, reducing armaments and armed forces, prohibiting the atomic weapon, and establishing international control. Thereby the burden of armaments will be lifted from the peoples of the world. Thereby the peoples of the world will be rid of the danger or, as the preamble of the resolution of the three States reads, from the fear of war.

But are the three Governments which submitted the draft of their resolution on this question ready to carry this out in reality? With the same sincerity with which we have hitherto replied to this question in the Subcommittee, I must repeat this answer here as well: No, they are not ready. These three Powers are not ready to carry out what they propose in the preamble, in the first paragraph of this preamble of the draft resolution of the "Three." This has been proved with special clarity by the debates in the Subcommittee and the efforts which have been exerted by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France to evade the need for settling this problem in a positive way. I am now coming to the differences on the most important problems which the Subcommittee has not succeeded in eliminating for reasons indicated by us earlier, for reasons which I shall try to present later on.

The first and most important question of the entire present problem is the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of an international control system. The Subcommittee has devoted much time and attention to this question, analyzing in detail the proposals of the Three and our proposals, but has not reached any agreement.

Yesterday Mr. Lloyd made short shrift of this question very easily by reducing the entire matter to one point—to the question of simultaneously prohibiting the atomic weapon and establishing an international control agency. This, of course, is an important question, but when Mr. Lloyd, speaking on behalf of all

three delegations, said nothing else in explanation of the attitude of these delegations to this problem, he undoubtedly was not being loyal to the principle of objectivity which he praised here so much when discussing the Subcommittee's work.

In reality this question has not one but a great many important aspects.

The Soviet Union demands and insists that the General Assembly make a decision declaring an unconditional ban on the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this ban and that a draft convention be drawn up and submitted for the consideration of the Security Council by February 1, 1952, providing for measures to ensure the implementation of this decision. This demand is contained in the amendments to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble and in Paragraph 3 of the amendments of the delegation of the USSR proposed for inclusion in the draft resolution of the Three.

The Soviet Union proposes that the Assembly thus adopt two resolutions simultaneously or, more correctly, make two decisions in one resolution: one—on the ban of the atomic weapon and the establishment of an international control agency, another—on drafting a convention with practical measures for ensuring the implementation of the decision of the General Assembly relating to the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control. Not limiting itself to this, the Soviet Union demands that reduction of armaments and armed forces begin immediately and proposes two measures.

First measure: a reduction of the armaments and armed forces of the five Powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, China and the Soviet Union—by one-third within one year of the adoption of the respective decision, and second measure: convocation of a world conference of all states, both members and non-members of the United Nations, to examine the question of a substantial reduction of armed forces and armaments and of practical measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control over the enforcement of such a prohibition.

Thus, according to the Soviet Union's proposal, three problems must be settled *simultaneously*:

1. The unconditional ban on the atomic weapon and the establishment of an international control agency;
2. A reduction of armaments and armed forces of all the five Powers;
3. The convocation of a world conference for realizing the same aims in the case of all other Powers.

That is why Mr. Lloyd was absolutely wrong yesterday in alleging that the Soviet Union separates the two problems — the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The Soviet Union's amendments to the three-power draft resolution point to the organic interconnection of these measures. In this case too Mr. Lloyd was not objective in presenting the position of the Soviet Union on the question of the reduction of armaments.

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France do not agree to these proposals. They object to these proposals, seeing in them some kind of a trap set by the Soviet Union.

The Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France hold that in order not to land in this trap it is necessary to postpone the prohibition of the atomic weapon until the machinery of international control is established and put into operation. They maintain that otherwise the entire matter will be reduced to a mere promise to prohibit the atomic weapon without any possibility of verifying whether this promise will really be fulfilled.

This consideration too cannot be regarded as convincing. A decision of the General Assembly, especially if it is adopted unanimously, cannot be regarded as worthless nor considered an empty phrase; it cannot be said that it will be of no significance whatever. As for the Soviet Union, we consider, and we declare this firmly and definitely, that we will regard such a decision as fully binding upon us even without any sanctions whatever which would be provided for nonfulfillment of this decision against

those who will not want to fulfill or will try to violate this decision.

But let us accept for one minute the standpoint of the sponsors of the draft resolution of the Three. Let us assume that all will agree that at first it is necessary to set up, as this is proposed by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, an international control agency and put it into operation, and only then will it be possible to implement the prohibition of the atomic weapon with all the consequences following therefrom. We shall not stop to recall that from the standpoint of the Soviet Union such a decision would be absolutely incorrect because it could not lead to the desired objective. But if the General Assembly were to act precisely as the United States, Great Britain and France insist, in that case the question would inevitably arise —what system of international control exactly do the Governments of the three States—the United States, Great Britain and France—propose? What system of international control exactly do they consider necessary to establish and put into operation in order to ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon, as they say?

We know what answer can be given, will be given and is already given to this question. We know that this is the Baruch plan which is being advertised as a plan of the United Nations and from which all three Governments — the United States, Great Britain and France — do not want to retreat a single step. True, they state that they are ready to examine any other plan if it will be better than the Baruch plan. But right there and then they add that there is no better plan and that they do not want to take one step from the so-called Baruch plan.

We do not agree to this. The shortcomings of this plan have been proved sufficiently and are admitted even by those who in the past were ready to defend this plan tooth and nail. For example, the *Times*, in the article "Disarmament" of December 1, 1951, pointed to the unsubstantiated merits of this plan, calling this plan utopian and not concealing such an important fact as that in practice it would be just as difficult for the United States to accept this plan as for the Soviet Union. In practice, the *Times* said, it would be just as difficult for the

United States to accept this utopian proposal as for the Soviet Union. Does this not contain a devastating appraisal of the practicability of these proposals or, to be more exact, does this not prove that these proposals are devoid of any practical significance? In such a case, however, a legitimate question arises: What grounds are there for the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France to continue to support the Baruch plan if even the *Times* considers that this plan has no merit whatever and that it is utopian, unacceptable in practice even for the sponsor of this plan — the United States itself?

Speaking of the Baruch plan, one must remember also some of its specific features as, for example, the notorious system of stages created especially to preserve for the United States under all conditions, and even after the establishment of an international control agency and its going into operation, and after the so-called prohibition of the atomic weapon, advantages in the manufacture of the atomic weapon which in the opinion of the United States it has. Why, the meaning of this system of stages consists in not disclosing one's secret and in preventing the prohibition of production of the atomic weapon immediately after the signing of the convention or adoption of the decision on the prohibition of the atomic weapon in some other way, and in postponing this matter until the later, until the latest stage, and, it should be assumed, until the very last stage, until the time that will never come.

Only naive people may not be able to see through the entire crafty mechanism of this system of stages, a system of so-called progressive "disclosure and verification," of which the Government of the United States, Great Britain and France tirelessly speak, not wishing, however, really to "disclose" and "verify" the most important and most dangerous weapon of mass destruction of the people.

The sole argument which, essentially speaking, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France put forth against the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapon boils down to the fear that some state will take the path of violating such a decision, will not carry out this decision, and that other

partners acting in good faith will find themselves in a position disadvantageous and unfavorable for them. Fear, however, is a poor counsel. It is a poor counsel in usual, everyday affairs; it is a still worse counsel in political affairs. Fear befogs the mind and impels those subjected to it to a false path and dictates wrong actions.

Nevertheless, we are told that it is impossible to take somebody's word. The Soviet Union, however, does not propose that anyone take somebody's word and is not itself inclined to take somebody's word. That is why the Soviet Union considers it necessary to establish strict, effective international control. International control, according to the idea of the Soviet Union, must really be international and not the kind that is being presented by the sponsors of the Baruch plan, whose views Baruch frankly expressed stating that the personnel of this agency should be, so far as possible, international. So far as possible!

In order somehow to get out of the difficulty arising in view of the refusal to agree to the immediate unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon, at least in principle, it is suggested that this cannot be allowed until international control is established and put into operation.

Mr. Lloyd said that the Soviet Union holds that there must be a certain period between the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control. Yes, indeed, there must be such a period and it must inevitably be in the very nature of things. And this has been admitted also by the sponsors of the Baruch plan themselves. At least in his speech of June 14, 1946, Baruch, speaking of the so-called stages of development, said that, "once a charter for the Authority has been adopted, the Authority and the system of control for which it will be responsible will require time to become fully organized and effective." He also said that only after the system of control over atomic energy was really implemented would the manufacture of the atom bomb be stopped.

Five years have already passed since then, however, and hope for the possibility of establishing a system of international control on the basis of the Baruch plan has vanished. There are no

grounds for expecting that the situation in this respect can change, all the less so since, as we have seen above, the Baruch plan is increasingly losing its supporters and adherents. But even five years ago it was impossible to agree to the solution of the problem of the atomic weapon proposed by the Baruch plan, which was energetically condemned and resisted by a number of states. But let us assume that on a certain day and hour a convention on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and on the establishment of international control is signed and ratified. In such a case it immediately comes into force and consequently the prohibition of the atomic weapon must also come into force, and thus it becomes a fact with all the resulting legal consequences, not to speak of the moral and political consequences.

What are these consequences?

The most important of them is the commitment of all states which ratified this convention to discontinue immediately the manufacture and, even more important, the utilization of the atomic weapon; to use immediately the already produced atom bombs exclusively for civilian purposes. Here are two consequences which follow from the very fact of the signing, ratification and coming into force, according to all international rules and international practice, of this convention, on the prohibition of the atomic weapon and on the establishment of international control. But if we take the standpoint of the sponsors of the draft resolution, this convention; notwithstanding the fact that it has been ratified and has become effective, will still not be operating because it is necessary to wait until the machinery of an international control agency is set up, until the necessary personnel is selected and until this entire machinery is set into motion. But will it be set into motion, and when exactly? There is silence on this point. Yet without any guarantee that this machinery will really be set into motion in the stipulated time, the entire convention with its prohibition of the atomic weapon becomes suspended in mid-air.

We have already drawn attention to the fact that the so-called international control agency planned by Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal must in substance be an American atomic supertrust and that it

would carry out a line corresponding to the policy of the United States, and not even to the policy of Great Britain, which, according to the authoritative statement of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, is now the chief atomic base of the United States of America, and even less to the policy of France, but corresponding only to the policy of the United States of America, which cannot allow any other situation without running the risk of losing the main lever of command in the entire sphere of atomic energy.

We remember that objective people, not interested in utilizing the international control agency for their own purposes, when analyzing the Baruch plan unanimously arrived at the conclusion that the Baruch plan in general aims to freeze or block the entire question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon.

Confirmation of such a conclusion can be found in Mr. Acheson's letter of 1946 accompanying the report on international control over atomic energy which directly states, as I have already pointed out, that the Baruch plan must not be interpreted as a commitment to prohibit the atomic weapon immediately after this plan is put into operation, and that, although such a necessity might subsequently arise, a decision, no matter when it is made, will be bound up with considerations of highest policy affecting the security of the United States and must be made by the Government of the United States in accordance with its constitutional processes and in the light of all the facts of the world situation.

What does this mean? This means that if the Baruch plan were adopted, if the Baruch plan envisaging an international control agency in accordance with the scheme it proposes were implemented, prohibition of the atomic weapon by the United States might not follow. In other words, the United States might not declare the prohibition of the atomic weapon even after international control is put into operation, if the interests of the United States, if the so-called highest interests of its policy, do not require this, or require a directly opposite decision.

What sense is there in making such a proposal with the reservations that are contained in such official documents as the letter of Acheson to the United States Secretary of State Byrnes, in the phrase which I have just quoted and which has not been refuted

or corrected by Acheson? What sense is there in assuring us that the proposal of the Soviet Union is illusory and not real, the proposal to ban the atomic weapon and instruct the Committee of Twelve to draw up a convention envisaging in it both international control and practical measures for the enforcement of this prohibition, and that, on the contrary, first to set up international control is real? This plan must be based on the Baruch plan. This plan, if it is adopted, will say everything except one thing, namely, except that as soon as this plan or this convention enters into force the atomic weapon will be immediately prohibited. This will not be said in the American plan!

In the official document this whole question is made dependent upon considerations of highest policy affecting the security of the United States, is made dependent upon the constitutional procedure of the United States and on the international situation, in the light of which, according to the Acheson memorandum, this question should be settled.

But is it not clear that this formula conceals reservations which can, even after a control agency is established and put into operation, direct the efforts of this control agency along channels which will most easily yield to certain pressure? These reservations will give the United States the possibility of protecting itself from any control on the part of this so-called international control agency by references to considerations of the "highest policy" and "facts of the world situation."

We propose a clear-cut and simple solution—to ban the atomic weapon.

Who has this atomic weapon now? The United States of America and the USSR.

We say openly and firmly: "Ban the atomic weapon," and we assume the obligation of carrying this out.

We are told: "No, we cannot take your word for it, accept our plan—the Baruch plan." But they tell us this only because they know that the Baruch plan they propose will never lead to the prohibition of the atomic weapon. They say this only to gain time in order to keep on stockpiling this horrible weapon more and more!

We are presented with a mythical plan, the prestige of which has been undermined even among those who formerly ardently supported it—take for example the *Times*. And is it only the *Times*?

That is why we can say that the presentation of the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon as it is done in the draft resolution of the "Three"—whereby the entire prohibition of the atomic weapon is made dependent upon the establishment of an international control agency, and then the setting into motion of this international agency itself is made dependent on "highest policy" and on the facts "in the light of the world situation"—is a bluff which can produce nothing but deception of the peoples. But you state that you do not want deception. Let us then turn these aspirations into tangible, flesh-and-blood deeds that will really show the peoples the truth and make them calm, free them from the fear that they, their homes, and their children will be destroyed, free them from the fear of war, as is said in the first paragraph of the preamble.

We say that it is incorrect to present the question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon and control as it is done in the draft resolution of the United States, Great Britain and France.

On the one hand prohibition of the atomic weapon is made dependent upon the establishment of an international control agency; on the other hand a plan for the establishment of this agency is proposed which:

1. Has already called forth serious objections and a negative appraisal on the part of a number of states, as well as institutions and specialists in this sphere in the United States, Great Britain and in other countries;

2. Has already been rejected by a number of states which do not agree to this plan and insist on a plan which would really ensure the establishment of an international control agency and the observance of elementary standards of international law, guaranteeing respect for state sovereignty.

Thus the proposal to make the prohibition of the atomic weapon dependent upon the establishment of an international control agency, which in turn is made dependent upon the adop-

tion of the Baruch plan, which in turn is made dependent upon highest policy and all kinds of other reservations, creates a vicious circle, in the full sense of the word, from which there is no way out.

But a way out must be found. And this way out may consist in the General Assembly's declaring immediately the unconditional ban on the atomic weapon and establishment of an international control agency and instructing the Committee of Twelve, which we have agreed to establish in the Subcommittee instead of the two formerly existing commissions, to prepare a convention providing for measures ensuring the implementation of this prohibition. The refusal to adopt such a proposal represents nothing else but refusal to get out from the impasse which is artificially being created or has already been created, an impasse which has continued for five years now and to which it is high time to put an end.

To our direct question as to whether the sponsors of the resolution of the "Three" agree that the General Assembly declare an unconditional ban on the atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this ban, Mr. Lloyd has not given an answer, preferring to get along with a hazy phrase that the "adoption of a tripartite draft resolution by the General Assembly would already be a declaration in favor of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons enforced by strict international control."

The work of the Subcommittee has shown that this hazy phrase conceals in reality a rejection of the proposal on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. Nevertheless the work of the Subcommittee has been useful because it has helped to reveal the thoughts which Mr. Lloyd has tried to cover up by diplomatic phrases.

It is necessary to face the truth and take facts as they are. And the facts are such that even if the proposal for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and detailed regulations on international control are included in one and the same convention, international control would not begin operating simultaneously with the signing of the convention but after the lapse of a certain time necessary

for carrying out a whole system of intricate organizational measures without which this control agency cannot operate. Those who are not interested in the prohibition of the atomic weapon are prepared to grasp at this circumstance, rooted in the very nature of things, in order to delay the discontinuation of the manufacture of the atomic weapon, to delay the ban against the utilization of the atomic weapon, to delay all this until the control machinery begins to function, although there is no indication anywhere of the provision to ensure that it will ever begin to function in general with things the way they are in this matter. We are told that our proposal means: first prohibition, and then control. This is untrue because we say—the decisions to ban the atomic weapon and establish international control must be made simultaneously and from them must follow all the consequences arising from the moral and political obligation such decisions impose. It is precisely the proposals contained in the draft resolution of the "Three," however, that amount to a refusal to prohibit the atomic weapon until the system of international control begins to operate. This means that even after the respective states agree on the need to ban the atomic weapon and to establish international control, they may ignore such an agreement and continue to manufacture atomic weapons and even to utilize them in carrying out their military plans and, even more, in the military actions they are conducting against other peoples.

It should be added to the above that there is absolutely no logic in the argument that a decision to prohibit the atomic weapon before the international control agency starts functioning will create a loophole and will make a fiction and a fraud of prohibition of the atomic weapon. Such a fraud, however, would certainly be exposed and would certainly cover with eternal shame the state which resorted to such perfidy.

There is another circumstance that must be noted here, namely, that even with no convention in existence prohibiting the use of the atomic weapon, the atomic weapon is not being used in the military actions unleashed in various places by the policy of a State which possesses the atomic weapon, although there are some madmen who are inciting to its use at present. If not moral con-

siderations, then apparently considerations of common sense, caution and fear that use of the atomic weapon may cause irreparable consequences restrain the people inclined to risky ventures from taking such a step.

There is already an example of how certain considerations, moral, political and others, I would say business considerations, prevented the use of poison gases against the enemy, as the Second World War showed, even by those not legally bound by the Hague Convention.

Why is all this forgotten now when the prohibition of the atomic weapon is being discussed? Why is such fierce resistance being offered now to the General Assembly's discharging its noble duty by declaring the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control, on the pretext that such decisions of the General Assembly might be utilized by unscrupulous governments for perfidious ends? There are no grounds for this whatever.

The attempt made yesterday by Britain's delegate to represent the plan of the Soviet delegation as a plan providing for stages is absolutely fruitless. He enumerated three such stages.

Lloyd objected to this plan precisely because it envisaged some kind of stages. Why then does he agree to these very same stages in the plan outlined in the tripartite draft resolution? This is difficult to explain by generally accepted laws of logic. But the point is that our plan does not envisage any stages, and this is easy to understand if account is taken of the fact that the essence of the system of stages is not in the transition from one position to another, which is perfectly natural because it is impossible to solve tasks immediately and simultaneously; the point is that the unacceptability of the system of stages stems from the fact that this transition from one position to another is made dependent upon various preliminary conditions which give wide scope for arbitrary action by the agencies put in charge of this matter.

Thus, in the sphere of prohibition of the atomic weapon, transition from the stage of control over raw materials to the stage of control over the production of the atomic weapon, according to the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, is made dependent upon a num-

ber of conditions, the appraisal of which is placed fully within the competence of the leading agency. Thus the transition from one stage to another, according to the Baruch plan, is not a natural, unhindered transition from one stage to another or from one action to another, but is made dependent upon the discretion and arbitrary will of those in charge of the given matter.

It is ridiculous to speak of stages when all that is meant is the performance of one task or another in a necessary sequence determined by physical and material aspects of the matter. Arguing, as Mr. Lloyd did yesterday, about stages, one could say, for example, that breakfast consists of a number of stages, and one could count quite a number of such stages, beginning with the setting of the table and ending with the last course.

All the above-mentioned considerations seem to us sufficient to eliminate all doubt not only concerning the fact that there are differences of opinion between the USSR, on the one hand, and the United States, Great Britain and France, on the other, with regard to methods and the attainment of common aims, as the memorandum says, but also that these so-called "common aims" are far from common and far from identical. One should have a clear understanding of the situation that has arisen. More work is necessary, much more, to make these "common aims" really common and really identical.

We have not lost hope that this can be accomplished in the course of our further persistent and patient work.

In support of our proposal that the General Assembly proclaim the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of international control, we indicated the special moral and political significance such a decision of the General Assembly would have. We must lay stress on this now too. Such a decision of the General Assembly will not be a scrap of paper, as some people think, nor an empty phrase, nor a fraud. It can be neither the one, nor the other, nor the third, because it accords with the innermost aspirations of millions of people and objectively can, must, and will serve to eliminate, or at least to lessen, international tension; it will serve the cause of peace, will be directed against warmongers and the policy of war adventures.

TH E second difference separating the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France from the USSR pertains to the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The substance of the proposal of the USSR is that the five Powers—the United States, Great Britain, France, China and the USSR—reduce all their armed forces and armaments by one-third in the course of one year. This proposal also meets with objection on the part of the above three Powers. Yet it should be said that in this case, too, we cannot recognize the arguments adduced to support this objection as in the least satisfactory.

Indeed, we are told that such a reduction cannot be regarded as a reduction contributing to peace if it is not known what armed might the Great Powers are reducing and to what level they intend to bring such a reduction. As for the level, we have already spoken about this in sufficient detail. The most essential point of this matter may be recalled in brief. This is that, so far, the initiators of the proposal regarding the level have not been able to say anything coherent about the principles which should determine this level. The attempt made here by Mr. Acheson on a previous occasion, as I explained last time, cannot be regarded as at all satisfactory. Taking the size of the country's territory and population as a basis, Mr. Acheson held that it is this that should serve as a criterion for defining the level. The bigger the country, the larger the population, the more armaments and armed forces the state should have. Mr. Acheson added, however, that nevertheless some kind of limit, some kind of ceiling, should be fixed beyond which this level must not rise. This means, however, that if the principle set forth by Mr. Acheson as a criterion and the level, of which the United States' representative spoke last time, are applied, the quantity of armaments and the numerical strength of the armed forces will correspond neither to the size of the country nor to the size of the population. What then, one naturally asks, remains of this so-called level? Besides, if one is to proceed from the so-called level, and this has already been confirmed by the representatives of France, Great Britain and the United States at the Conference of the four Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris, the entire question may, in the final analy-

sis, result not in a reduction but in an increase of armaments. What then, one naturally asks, is the value of this level and this entire undertaking concerning the so-called reduction of armed forces if no reduction of armed forces whatever may result?

The second question raised by the representative of Great Britain pertains to the need to know the size of the armed forces and armaments of each country. We also sufficiently explained this question when we pointed out that if the reduction proposed by the Soviet Union is agreed to, all the figures on armed forces and armaments will be laid on the table at once. This is also evident from Paragraph 7 of the amendments of the USSR, which declares that all the states submit forthwith to the international control agency, and, in any case, not later than one month after the acceptance by the General Assembly of decisions for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, complete information regarding the state of their armed forces and all types of armaments, including the atomic weapon, at the time of acceptance of the said decisions.

If the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France are really interested in exact information about the armaments and armed forces of the USSR, here is a direct way to obtain it. In that case Mr. Lloyd, as well as the representatives of the other two Powers in whose name Mr. Lloyd spoke, will have no need of using information which he himself said here was not quite accurate or, as I would say, is altogether inaccurate.

What then in such a case is left of the objections to the Soviet proposal for a reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed forces of the five Great Powers? Nothing, except perhaps the objection that such a reduction will not create a "balance of power" and will leave intact the Soviet Union's alleged military superiority. But if Lloyd is using inaccurate information about the armaments and armed forces of the Soviet Union, as he himself has admitted, then how can he talk about the military superiority of the USSR which, of course, is determined by data about armaments and armed forces, and without which data it is impossible to estimate the military power of any state?

From the speeches of the representatives of the United States,

Great Britain and France, it is clear that the theory of the so-called balance of power underlies their position on this issue. But this theory has never served the cause of peace. Even more, it has never yet been possible to achieve the so-called balance of power.

It is known, for example, that the so-called balance of power in the Far East as provided for at the Washington Conference of 1921-22 on naval limitation was a model of absolute instability in the very fields in which the attempt was made to achieve a balance and stability of the situation. In reality the Washington agreement not only did not ensure a "balance of power" in the Far East but consolidated Japan's undivided domination in Southern Manchuria and gave Japan important strategic guarantees in case of war, which guarantees Japan did not fail to use in the Second World War, turning upside down, in the graphic words of the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, the entire system of the postwar peace regime.

This brings to mind the rather witty question asked by a British political leader as to how the requirements of a naval Power like Great Britain can be balanced with the requirements of a land Power like the Soviet Union. How can infantry divisions, this question asked, be measured against atom bombs or heavy bomber squadrons; how can jet planes be compared with piston engine planes, or modern submarines with prewar submarines?

Yet, ignoring all the lessons of history, all the facts of the very recent past, ignoring the lessons of the Second World War unleashed by Hitlerite Germany, militarist Japan and fascist Italy, but, on the other hand, reverently remembering the practice of the League of Nations, harmful to the cause of peace, an attempt is now being made to turn the United Nations organization onto a path, already known for its disastrous consequences, of strengthening peace by the so-called "balance of power."

The Soviet Union will not move along this path. The Soviet Union also urges the United Nations not to take this path if it does not intend sharing the sadly remembered fate of the League of Nations.



THE memorandum points out that evidently all agree to the idea of convoking a world conference of all the states on armaments reduction, but that in this matter there are essential differences with regard to the method and time for the convocation of the conference. This is true, for there are such differences, unfortunately. But these differences go much further than just method and time.

Taking the matter of convoking a world conference seriously, the Soviet Union recommends that the General Assembly adopt a corresponding decision in perfectly clear and unequivocal terms.

The method of convoking such a conference—this is a decision of the General Assembly containing an appeal to the governments of all the states, both members of the United Nations and states at present not members of the United Nations.

Time—not later than June 1, 1952.

The preparation of the world conference—recommendations that the Security Council prepare and submit, within three months, practical proposals for the implementation of the entire decision of the General Assembly, the draft of which we are discussing and, consequently, of that part of the decision which concerns the convocation of the world conference.

It seems clear that every sincere supporter of the world conference should without reservation uphold those proposals. However the three Governments—the United States, Great Britain and France—propose a different method. They limit themselves merely to the statement on behalf of the General Assembly that such a conference should be convoked, without indicating the date, even approximately, for the convocation of such a conference. They limit themselves to indicating that this conference should be called when the work of the Committee of Twelve is at a stage when, in that Committee's opinion, some part of its program is ready for submission to the Governments and, consequently, the conference may be called. Thus, in this case too, the whole matter boils down to mere desires unconnected with practical measures of any sort and is, therefore, of very little significance, if not to say of no significance at all.

A comparison of these two proposals is sufficient to reveal

clearly the entire difference between them and to leave no doubt that in reality the three Governments are not at all concerned about the convocation of a world conference on armaments reduction nor, therefore, about an actual reduction of armaments and armed forces within as short a time as possible. Yet this is precisely what the interests of peace demand, the interests of all peace-loving peoples.

I have dwelt in sufficient detail—regretfully in more detail than I would have wished—on only the most important questions causing differences between the USSR, on the one hand, and the three Powers, on the other. I did this only to show how important these differences are, differences determined by the policy of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and by the policy of the three Powers—the United States, Great Britain and France—on the other, in the given matter, *i.e.*, in the matter of prohibition of the atomic weapon, establishment of international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

The elimination of these differences is of tremendous significance in the important matter of removing the tension in international relations, in the matter of improving these relations.

In the Subcommittee we arrived at certain important decisions. Even what are called here and referred to in the memorandum as minor decisions, despite the fact that they are minor, are of great importance. Every step which eliminates differences between us, let them be in minor matters at present, gives us hope that the next step may eliminate differences in more important matters. And we are striving for this, we want this, we are working for this.

Certain important decisions were reached in the Subcommittee, in particular decisions on uniting the commissions, on the composition of the joint committee, on its membership, and procedure of work; the question of voting and of the "veto" have been clarified. An agreement was achieved on all these questions. I believe that my neighbors on the right will confirm this.

It is hardly necessary to stress how important all this is to the cause of peace, to the welfare of the peoples who are demanding of the United Nations organization that it take active and decisive

measures to terminate the frantic armaments drive which is tightening the noose around the necks of the states following this path, the armaments drive which is swallowing huge resources and energies for the preparation of a new world war, resources and energies which could be used to improve the economic position of the population suffering from the armaments drive and weighed down by the burden of war budgets in the States of the Atlantic camp.

The United Nations organization is faced with a tremendous task—the task of unconditionally prohibiting the atomic weapon, of reducing armaments and armed forces and establishing strict international control. We must continue this work, the work in this direction, and utilize every opportunity which arises to accomplish the above-mentioned task in the interests of strengthening peace, in the interests of all peace-loving peoples.

Speech in the Political Committee

December 18, 1951

DURING the past few days the attention of the First Committee has been concentrated on the so-called revised draft resolution of the "Three" — the United States, Great Britain, and France — and the amendments to it submitted by the delegation of the USSR.

The representatives of certain delegations, first and foremost the authors of the altered draft resolution, have spent no little effort trying to convince us that the changes which have been introduced in this draft actually entitle it to be regarded as an altered draft, as a revised draft, when compared with the original draft of the same three Powers — the United States, Great Britain and France — submitted by them as early as November 19.

Careful examination of the revised draft resolution, however, does not reveal any really serious changes in it. True, individual minor corrections have been introduced in this draft, but in substance this so-called revised draft does not differ from the previous one. This draft, like the original one, constitutes an attempt to substitute for the question on reduction of armaments and armed forces, prohibition of atomic weapons and establishment of international control, the proposal to collect information on armaments and armed forces, and essentially it goes no further than that. As before, this draft retains the objective of frustrating the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Therefore, one must be very careful in accepting the statements made here by the authors of this draft, primarily by Mr.

Jessup, that the United States strives to find a practical solution which would lead to certain, as he said, agreed results in order to relieve international tension, and that the proposals put forward by the United States allegedly constitute the key to a future decision, opening a wide road along which it is possible to advance, striving for the solution of the unsettled problems and the lessening of friction and disagreements. If on the given question the Government of the United States had really been guided by such aspirations, there would be no necessity to resort to such hazy and indefinite formulations as those running through the revised draft resolution of the "Three," which in this respect does not in the least differ from the original draft of this resolution. This is most obvious, for instance, from an analysis of Paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution of the "Three," whose entire difference from the original text of this paragraph of the draft resolution consists in the rephrasing of some of the provisions and in a more subtle formulation of others, which serve no less to mask the real purpose of this paragraph which actually reduces itself to the defense of that very same Baruch plan at all costs.

In this so-called revised draft resolution of the "Three" everything finally boils down to several changes of secondary importance which have the objective of diverting attention from the basic line of the United States, Great Britain and France, which aims to hold firmly to the fundamental conceptions of which Messrs. Jessup, Lloyd and Moch have spoken here, having in mind that very same Baruch plan.

All the latest statements of Mr. Jessup, echoed by Messrs. Lloyd, Moch and several other delegates, for example the representatives of Bolivia and Peru, to the effect that the United States allegedly tries to achieve an international system which would secure the reduction of all armed forces and all types of armaments, are completely contradicted by the many facts that permeate the entire practice and policy of the United States of America and certain other states limping in its wake.

Despite the fact that this is the second month that the United Nations has been extensively discussing the questions of prohi-

bition of atomic weapons, establishment of international control and reduction of armaments and armed forces, and that the United States, Great Britain and France declare their willingness to take the necessary measures in this sphere — these states are limiting themselves to mere declarations, which, in addition, are attended by serious resistance to any attempt to put these declarations into any sort of definite form, even remotely resembling a decision of the General Assembly. And at the same time in these countries, under the leadership of their governments, ceaseless work is under way, assuming ever greater proportions, to increase further the armaments and armed forces of these countries, constantly to produce and perfect new types of weapons of aggression and mass destruction of people, such as atomic weapons.

• The last semi-annual 1951 report of the United States Secretary of Defense to the President of the United States insists on the further expansion of the American military program, and calls upon the American people to make further sacrifices so that this military program can be successfully fulfilled.

In his report, the United States Secretary of Defense speaks of the most gratifying, as he puts it, successes attained in the development of different types of atomic weapons and the researches in creating thermo-nuclear armaments, not to speak of planes, naval vessels, tanks, and so on and so forth.

Mr. Lovett, the United States Secretary of Defense, literally goes into raptures over the growth of armaments in the United States on the basis of the American military budget of 60 billion dollars.

Notwithstanding the warning voices already sounding here and there about the danger of the approaching crisis of over-production, the expansion of war industry at the expense of civilian industry is proceeding full blast, with the volume of war production in the United States at present, as is known, amounting at least to two billion dollars monthly, which is three times above the level of the last month of 1950.

Notwithstanding the fact that the policy of an armaments drive and the preparation for another war is increasingly un-

dermining the economies of the countries which have chosen such a path in their domestic and foreign policy, a policy disastrous for the economies of these countries, this line is still being carried out, inspired, on the one hand, by such organizations of employers as the National Association of Manufacturers in the United States and West European countries, which are raking in profits on the war and war preparations, and, on the other hand, by the leaders of the foreign policy of these countries, which have united in the aggressive Atlantic bloc.

In this connection one must mention the recent statement of Foster, spokesman of the United States Defense Department, who called for the acceleration of the production of armaments both in the United States and in the countries of Western Europe allied with it, and who warned of the various dangers which the world, according to him, allegedly faces.

"We must," Foster said, "clearly understand that next year might be the most dangerous in the history of the West. If we accustom ourselves to this idea," he continued, "and act accordingly, we will be fully able to accomplish what we are urged to accomplish by General Eisenhower and many other leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance and carry out our program of re-armament." In other words, of the armaments drive.

That is why the United States Government and the Governments of Great Britain and France, obediently following it, do not really take measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. To adopt such proposals and to begin really to carry them out by no means tallies with the entire trend of the present foreign policy of the United States, which is stubbornly steering a course of complicating international relations and preparing another world war.

Under such circumstances is it feasible to assume that the ruling circles of the United States — as well as those of Great Britain and France, supporting them in this matter — can really seriously strive for a reduction of armaments and armed forces and for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of international control?

That is why we venture to say in reply to the question put to us above that it is precisely here that one must look for an explanation of that resolute resistance which is being offered by the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France to the adoption of the proposals of the Soviet Union and of the amendments in which these proposals are formulated and which are designed for real prohibition of atomic weapons, real establishment of international control, and real reduction of armaments and armed forces.

That is why in the speeches of Mr. Jessup, not to mention the speeches of Messrs. Lloyd and Moch, it is impossible to find — and we do not find — any striving to reconcile the stand of the United States, Great Britain and France on the given question with the stand of the Soviet Union. They stubbornly resist this rapprochement, which is of course quite natural, since the Soviet Union insists not on verbal assurances of readiness to carry out these important decisions that are really capable of eliminating the tension in international relations and of ensuring the peace and security of the peoples, but insists on these decisions themselves, decisions such as the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, establishment of strict international control over the enforcement of this prohibition, and reduction of armaments and armed forces.

But these Powers cannot at the same time merely reject the Soviet proposals, the Soviet amendments. They have to lend a semblance of propriety to their stand on this question. They have to cover up their stand with florid verbiage, behind which they try to conceal the real substance of the matter.

Worthy of attention in this connection is the report carried recently in the American press to the effect that Richard Bissell, Assistant Chief of the Mutual Security Agency of the United States, urged that the foreign policy of the United States be formulated anew in such a way as to show—precisely to show and only to show—that the program of European rearmament is a secondary matter compared with the broader aim of improving the social and economic position of the West European countries.

Bissell referred to the fact that the prestige of America had

dropped alarmingly in the estimation of the world public during the past year because the people, according to Bissell, had begun to arrive at the conclusion that the United States stands solely for armaments and that all assertions that the United States allegedly seeks some end other than the armaments drive and the increase of armed forces have been blasted.

There can be no doubt that the introduction at the Sixth Session, right here at our Sixth Session of the General Assembly, of the draft resolution of the "Three" on the reduction of armaments and armed forces pursues a similar aim — to submerge the real reduction of armaments and armed forces and the real prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about the prohibition of atomic weapons, and to reduce the entire matter merely to the collecting of information on armed forces and armaments and, as previously, to concentrate on the armaments drive, on thwarting any reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons.

We all make no secret of the fact that it is precisely from this standpoint that we consider both the original draft of the resolution of the "Three" and the altered draft of this resolution.

Notwithstanding certain editorial changes, the content of the draft resolution of the United States, Great Britain and France in the revised version remains exactly the same as that of their former draft. One can easily become convinced of this by carefully examining the revised draft of the above resolution. If this revised draft does contain some new elements, it must be said that this by no means improves matters. This should first of all be said about the second paragraph of the preamble of the revised draft resolution of the "Three" which refers to the so-called effective system of collective security.

Needless to say, the striving for effective collective security in itself, to which, as is known, special articles of the United Nations Charter, namely Articles 51 and 52, are devoted, cannot, of course, arouse any objection if the Charter is really adhered to and if this formula is applied in conformity with the principles, aims and tasks of the United Nations. We know, however, that the formula for an effective system of collective

security was already used, not only not in conformity with the United Nations Charter, but in direct violation of the Charter, when the resolution of November 3, 1950, imposed by the Atlantic grouping of United Nations members, approved measures that had nothing in common with the principles enunciated in the Charter.

The events of last year have shown with still greater clarity that the program of so-called collective measures envisaged in Resolution No. 377 — of which we shall speak in more detail later when dealing directly with this question — in reality is a dangerous program, a program, I will say outright — of war, although camouflaged by phrases about security, phrases about peace.

The program outlined in the report of the so-called Collective Measures Committee is bound up with the continuation of the armaments drive, mobilization of manpower and material resources for the further prosecution of the war in the Far East undertaken by the Atlantic bloc, with the preparation for other war ventures and, consequently, has nothing in common with the task now confronting the United Nations — the task of reducing armaments and armed forces.

It is known that the references to collective measures, to "effective" so-called measures of "defense" and similar aims which camouflage the bellicose schemes and plans of their sponsors are extensively used precisely for the further spreading of war psychosis, the further expansion and intensification of war measures.

The incorporation of this formula in the altered draft resolution of the "Three" is incompatible with the aims which the United Nations Charter sets before them when it speaks of effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of a threat to peace and the suppression of acts of aggression and the prevention of other violations of peace or, as it is stated in Article 51 of the Charter, for the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense and of maintenance of international peace and security.

The second paragraph of the preamble of the altered draft resolution, speaking of this effective system of so-called collec-

tive measures, undoubtedly has in view the so-called system of collective security already reflected in the Resolution of the General Assembly adopted at the Fifth Session. The delegation of the USSR objected to this resolution; a number of other delegations objected to it because all these "collective measures" are in reality directed not at defending peace, as shown for example by the war in Korea, but at facilitating the implementation of the aggressive plans of the Atlantic bloc, which tries to play a leading part in deciding matters of war and peace in the United Nations.

If we turn to Paragraph 3 of the preamble of the revised draft resolution of the "Three" which replaced Paragraph 2 of the original draft, the entire difference consists in that the phrase about "levels adequate for defense but not for aggression" has been omitted here, if we do not count one more difference: this is that the words "the necessary means to this end," which were in the original draft at the end of this paragraph, have now been transferred to the beginning of this paragraph.

Mr. Jessup explained that the phrase about the level of armed forces and armaments was deleted because of the doubts about this formulation voiced by the representatives of the USSR and other delegates, and he presented this as some kind of an essential change.

Although the revised draft resolution of the "Three" no longer contains references to the "level" or to the "criterion" of the general limits and restrictions of all armed forces and armaments, this, however, by no means signifies that the sponsors of the draft have really decided to abandon their stand on this matter.

Such a supposition would be completely groundless, and this is clearly seen from Point 6-A of the revised draft resolution which reproduces the idea expressed in Paragraph 3 of the preamble and in Point 5-B of the original draft.

Indeed, Point 6-A instructs the commission to define the way in which the general limits and reduction of all armed forces and all armaments can be calculated and established. However,

this of course obligates the commission to determine the very same level, determine the very same criterion of which the original draft spoke. Thus, the matter remains in the very same form as in the original.

In its time the delegation of the USSR proposed to substitute another point for Point 5 of the original draft. The same holds true also for the present Point 6 of the revised draft, which we propose to replace with another point, namely to instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare, within three months, practical proposals for the application of said decision for submission to the Security Council, having in view the decision of the General Assembly on the given question.

We consider it inexpedient to give the commission the narrow assignment contained in Point 6 of the revised draft resolution which, moreover, is again reduced to defining the "level" and "criteria," which is exceedingly inexpedient, as shown by the experience of the fruitless discussion of such questions.

We consider more expedient and more practicable the proposal of the head of the Syrian delegation who spoke of the need to give the commission freedom of action and not to vest it with restricted powers which could hamper it in finding ways for solving the problems confronting it.

The proposal of the Soviet delegation is heading in this direction, and this seems correct to us. This opens better prospects to the commission in its future work.

* * *

An important question is a one-third reduction by the permanent members of the Security Council — the United States, Great Britain, France, China and the USSR—of the armaments and armed forces in their possession at the moment of the adoption of the given resolution in the course of one year, counted from the date of the adoption of this resolution.

M. Moch tried to joke here on this score — he himself being the one who enjoyed it most — by relating anecdotes about a man who has one suit of clothes and who is asked to cut this

suit by one-third. The representative of France, however, would do better not to joke about such matters affecting the situation in certain countries where, with the policy they are pursuing now, many people will soon be without even one suit of clothes. (*Laughter.*)

The point spoken of in the amendments of the Soviet Union proposes that the General Assembly should "urge the governments of all states, both members of the United Nations and those not members of the United Nations at present, to submit immediately to the international control agency, and in any case not later than within one month after the General Assembly adopts decisions on the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces, complete information regarding the state of their armed forces and all types of armaments, including information on atomic weapons, at the time of the adoption of the said decisions."

I see no need to speak again at length in favor of these two provisions which I have just outlined.

I pointed out that the objections to this proposal, *i.e.*, our proposal for the one-third reduction by the Great Powers of all armaments and armed forces, are based on the utterly false assertions that the adoption of such a proposal would preserve for the Soviet Union its alleged military superiority. We also pointed out that the objections to the proposal of the Soviet Union, moreover, are based on the false theory of the so-called "balance of power."

We cited arguments and presented historic facts refuting both this theory and the stand of those who are again trying to revive this theory and to apply it to present conditions, asserting that precisely the "balance of power" among the Great Powers can be a guarantee of international peace and security.

Unfortunately we have heard nothing in reply to this criticism, except the unconvincing arguments of the Bolivian delegate on this subject.

The Bolivian delegate considered it necessary to present objections to our arguments, but the Bolivian delegate had to admit that after hearing from the Soviet delegation about the

Washington agreement of 1921-1922 and taking an interest in this question — which we, of course, can only welcome—he began to study this agreement and arrived at the conclusion that this agreement was aimed at ensuring peace in the Far East by establishing a balance of armed forces among the United States, Great Britain and Japan, but that in 1934 militaristic Japan denounced this agreement, became an aggressor and unleashed the war in the Far East.

But I spoke of the very same thing. What then did the Bolivian delegate change or add to what I had said, except that he revealed the secret of his "erudition" in this matter?

But having said what he did, he unfortunately did not draw the proper conclusion from it. Evidently he was hampered by the lack of time and by his haste in studying this question. Yet, by carefully weighing the facts which he learned from his apparently haphazard and cursory examination of the given question it would not have been difficult for the Bolivian delegate to draw this conclusion on the given question. And this conclusion could only be: the Washington agreement did not prevent Japanese aggression, and the so-called "balance of power" collapsed under the weight of the contradictions which then split the Powers that concluded the Washington agreement, contradictions which continue to operate in the camp of the capitalist powers even at the present time.

Peru's delegate, too, made a mistake in stating that the Soviet Union, while seeking prohibition of atomic weapons, at the same time strives to preserve for itself freedom of action with regard to other types of weapons of no less destructive effect.

I must remind the representative of Peru, as well as the representative of Lebanon who expressed the same idea, if I am not mistaken, that as far back as 1948, in the additional proposals to the Soviet draft plan for the work of the Conventional Armaments Commission, the USSR submitted a proposal pointing to the need for full prohibition of production and use not only of atomic weapons, but also of other types of weapons designed for mass destruction.

Thus, the question of the need to remove and prohibit not

only atomic weapons but also all other types of weapons of mass destruction of people, raised by them after a delay of three years, had already been put forth by the Soviet delegation in 1948. Since then there has not been the slightest hint on the part of the Soviet Union that it has changed its stand on this question. Such a formulation of the question fully conforms to the stand and the general policy of the Soviet Union which it has adopted from the time this question first arose.

This, for instance, finds expression, and will find expression also in the fact that I can now declare that we fully support the amendment proposed yesterday by the Egyptian delegation, which not only mentions the unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons but also speaks of all other types of weapons of mass destruction.

We support this fully and entirely, Mr. Delegate of Peru, and you can be perfectly at ease on that score.

If you really want all other weapons of mass destruction prohibited along with the prohibition of atomic weapons, then vote today for the prohibition of atomic weapons. But you will not vote for this. And you referred here to the principal types of weapons of mass destruction in addition to atomic weapons only in order to cover up the fact that you will vote for the resolution which does not contain even a hint of the prohibition of atomic weapons, to cover up your rejection of this prohibition by artificial, hazy, indefinite, vague and ambiguous phrases on this score.

And you say that our position is not clear, that there is something we want to conceal, that we want to utilize something in our own interests when we demand that analogous types of weapons in possession of other states be withdrawn from national armaments. You are wrong. You are entirely wrong. You are following too servilely the road which you ought not to follow.

The delegate of Peru also made a mistake in the interpretation of the concept "unconditional" prohibition of atomic weapons.

I even find it strange and amusing to speak of it. I know that

they do not like it when I say that I am amused. But really "it is no sin to laugh at what is really funny." We say "unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon." And you tell us that we make "unconditional" dependent on control! We have never done anything of the kind.

You are entirely mistaken in your understanding of the expression "unconditional prohibition." I must explain that unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, as we understand it, is not at all dependent upon control, upon its organization, its forms, upon the methods of performing the functions of control, and so on. No, when the Soviet Union demands unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons it means that the prohibition of atomic weapons must not be made dependent upon any conditions, such as "stages" advanced in the Baruch plan or upon any other conditions capable of nullifying or even restricting to any degree the operation of the prohibition of atomic weapons.

This is how we understand it, and therefore it is we who really insist on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons.

We have always argued that control cannot automatically bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons. Control can only fulfill the functions of control, that is, the functions of verifying the observance of this prohibition. And if there is no prohibition, then there is no purpose in control — whether prohibition is declared unconditionally or conditionally.

It seems to me that after more than five years of debating this question, it is time to understand each other's position. The delegate of Peru has probably still not gained proper understanding of this question.

The delegate of Peru referred to mathematical paradoxes. In this too he made a mistake, because it is far better to deal with and use logical arguments and not mathematical paradoxes. A paradox always remains a paradox, and it is a paradox for the very reason that it has no right to claim to be the truth. But logic always remains logic, *i.e.*, it differs from paradox in that it has the right to claim to be the truth, for what is logical is real, and,

vice versa, what is contrary to logic cannot be recognized as real or true.

How far Peru's delegate actually is from the realm of truth, from the realm of reality, is obvious from his absolutely unsubstantiated and biased remark alleging that the policy of the Soviet Union has led to the disappearance of trust in the world. With all the reservations of a well-bred person, he nevertheless said such a thing. Is it possible that he who said this really believes what he said — believes that trust has disappeared in international relations because of the Soviet Union? Do you really think so? I doubt it, because only persons who wear blinders and who cannot see what is going on around them because of these blinders can think so.

For all the facts before us, around us, facing us — all of them prove that it is by no means the Soviet Union's fault that trust has disappeared from international relations. I shall not, of course, enumerate these facts, Mr. President, not because Mr. Jessup may lose his self-control and demand a cessation of the exposition of these facts, as he did yesterday during the speech of my colleague, the Byelorussian delegate, but because we have spoken of this many times here, and I do not want to take undue advantage of the First Committee's time and patience. I shall merely say that in such a case the delegate of Peru adheres to the view — in speaking of the facts — that if the statement is contrary to the facts, then too bad for the facts.

I could draw a certain parallel here between the speech of the delegate of Peru and that of the delegate of France. The delegate of France also tried to make insinuations against us, although he knows very well that if he does, he will be exposed at once. Digressions such as M. Moch permitted himself here, hinting at some 15 countries which have allegedly lost their independence through the fault of the Soviet Union — digressions of this kind are a form of military cunning, springing from the consciousness of the absolute inability to defend a position which cannot honestly be defended, and from the desire to divert attention from the question under discussion even at the cost of methods impermissible in decent society.

As for the substance of the question we are discussing, M. Moch preferred to repeat here the phrase that the Soviet Union is trying, he says, to preserve its superiority in armed forces and to eliminate the superiority of the United States, Great Britain, and France where, according to Moch, it exists. He again spoke of the size of the Soviet Union's armed forces, of the number of divisions and aircraft, which he allegedly knows with surprising exactness, and he deliberately understated the corresponding data concerning the armed forces of the United States and its allies.

Need we return to this question? And if we do need to return, then is it not enough to suggest that M. Moch and those who are prepared to follow him in this matter at least take pains to read the minutes of the Special Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee of the United States House of Representatives for 1951? These minutes give data on the armed forces of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and even Luxembourg. According to this data, the total number of armed forces of these countries is almost 5,500,000. This data, even compared with the mythical data used here by M. Moch and others in talking about the armed forces of the Soviet Union, is sufficient to expose the entire groundlessness of the whole stand and the argumentation of M. Moch and others in this matter.

Nevertheless M. Moch, following Mr. Jessup, continues to repeat arguments which, in face of such facts, are utterly senseless. He depicts the matter incorrectly, representing our proposal for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction of armaments and armed forces as a unilateral demand designed to deprive the United States of atomic superiority and to preserve our own superiority in all other respects.

This is wrong. This is wrong, if only because the prohibition of atomic weapons should extend to all countries possessing atomic weapons, and, therefore, all such countries should be deprived of the superiority which the possession of atomic weapons gives them.

As for conventional armaments, here too the one-third reduction of armaments and armed forces by the five Great Powers in the course of one year will give no advantage to the Soviet Union. This is quite obvious from the way the matter stands with regard to the present state of armaments and armed forces, of which we have already spoken, and particularly from the absolutely indisputable fact that the purpose of the Soviet Union's armed forces is to protect its frontiers and not to carry out any aggressive plans, which are alien to the Soviet State and to Soviet foreign policy.

Even Mr. Acheson admitted that it was natural for a large country with a large population and with a very long frontier to have a large army also. A large army of a peaceful state cannot be a threat to any state, even to a state with a smaller army or even with a very small and weak army. On the contrary, a small but aggressive state pursuing an aggressive policy and cherishing plans to dominate neighboring countries and even the idea to dominate the world is a real menace to world peace as, for instance, was the case with old Prussia which was by no means a large state but was an aggressive state, a warlike state, and was, therefore, always a threat to peace, even though it had a comparatively small army.

This is confirmed by numerous facts from the history of the nations, and these facts ought not to be forgotten, just as the lessons of history ought not to be ignored. Certain delegates, however, are not inclined to remember the facts of history, but are inclined, on the contrary, to close their eyes to these facts and even more, to contemporary facts. This refers, in particular, to those who tried here to dispute the fact that the responsibility for international tension lies with the Atlantic bloc countries headed by the United States of America. But is it not a fact that this tension is caused by the frantic armaments drive, by the organization of new military bases and the expansion of the already existing bases in foreign countries? I shall remind you, for instance, that today, at the present moment, the United States is organizing five new air bases and, it seems, atomic bases in Morocco. In any case atomic weapons have now been adopted

as a part of the armaments of the entire American Army. Does this not cause an increase in tension, nervousness, alarm; does it not evoke anxiety, shake the security and confidence in security of the various nations? Do not the unleashing of military actions in the Far East, the throwing together of new military blocs and the open preparation for a new world war—as testified to by the numerous facts from the activities primarily of the United States of America—complicate and cause tension in international relations?

But who is implementing all the measures enumerated above? Who is conducting this frantic armaments drive? Who is building new military bases and expanding the old ones in the various parts of the world, with the chief aim of encircling the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies with a belt of these bases?

Certainly it is the United States, having set an example of this armaments drive in its own country too, which must bear the responsibility for rearmament, *i.e.*, for the armaments drive, now taking place in certain countries of Western Europe. To be convinced of this it is sufficient to see what took place in Rome at the Atlantic bloc council and what is now taking place generally in the camp of the Atlantic bloc.

Let us take France for example. A few days ago the newspaper *Le Monde* wrote that the American Government was continuing to bring pressure to bear on the French Government in order to get it to exceed the "French budgetary possibilities," as *Le Monde* wrote, established in October 1950, *i.e.*, to get the budget increased still more, and this in spite of the fact that the French Ministry of Defense has set the expenditures, as is known, at 610 billion in 1951, 725 billion in 1952 and 752 billion in 1953, not counting Indo-China, the overseas territories and the expenditures on the so-called NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization).

Naturally the French Government, as the same *Le Monde* reports, must ask Harriman for an increase in American aid to make up for the deficit which, according to *Le Monde*, "may endanger the French armaments program beyond repair."

But a similar situation has also arisen at present with regard

to Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and West Germany, where all measures regarding so-called rearmament, or, more correctly speaking, the armaments drive, are determined by the policy and direction of aggressive circles in the United States.

Porter, President Truman's acting Special Representative in the Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe, recently declared, at the beginning of December this year, that Europe's main task now is rearmament and not rehabilitation. Moreover, he warned that "the burden of rearmament will be heavy," but that "the European workers and farmers must bear this burden."

Who then, we ask, is the moving spirit of so-called rearmament, of, more correctly speaking, the frantic armaments drive being whipped up by aggressive circles in the United States, which is already causing their friends in Europe and other parts of the world to split their seams?

This is a question worth thinking about before coming out with risky arguments in defense of the American policy of an armaments drive, before making decisions in this direction in support of this policy of an armaments drive.

It cannot be denied that these are precisely the activities of the aggressive circles of the United States of America which also determine its corresponding foreign policy.

Therefore, we have the right to assert that the responsibility for the present world tension rests precisely with these aggressive circles of the United States, Great Britain and France which head the aggressive Atlantic bloc.

Every day brings a stronger and more definite exposure of the nonsensical stories of an alleged threat from the Soviet Union. It is time it was understood once and for all that the Soviet Union has never threatened anyone and does not threaten anyone. And this has been proved by all of the more than 30 years' history of the Soviet State, which has been advancing steadfastly along the path of strengthening peace and international co-operation and ensuring the security of nations. On the other hand, every day brings new facts proving that the threat to peace and the security of nations comes from the aggressive Atlantic bloc. It is this which explains the specific nature of the

drafts of various resolutions submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly by the leaders of the Atlantic bloc. Such is the nature also of the revised draft resolution of the "Three" which, as we have already shown during the discussion of a number of its basic points, does not solve a single problem related to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments and, even less, to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control. Yet in this matter there must be complete clarity. Guided by precisely such considerations, the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed to include in the draft resolution of the "Three," as the first item of the operative part, a point proposing that the General Assembly declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control to ensure the observance of this prohibition. In this point the delegation of the USSR proposes that the General Assembly instruct the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to draw up and submit for the consideration of the Security Council a draft convention providing for measures to ensure the implementation of the General Assembly's decisions relating to the prohibition of atomic weapons, cessation of their production, use solely for civilian purposes of the atomic bombs already produced and the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of the said convention.

Can there be any comparison between these unequivocal, clear-cut, resolute and definite proposals of the Soviet Union and the hazy, indefinite proposals, accompanied by all kinds of reservations and conditions, contained in Point 3 of the draft resolution of the "Three"? It is high time to realize clearly the profound difference in principle between these two resolutions. On one side, on the side of the Soviet Union, there is a proposal to declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control, to draw up a convention in the shortest time possible providing for measures to ensure the implementation of this prohibition. This is what we have on one side, on the side of the Soviet Union.

On the other side, on the side of the United States, Great

Britain and France, there is neither a declaration of the prohibition of the atomic weapon nor a decision to establish international control. There are, however, quite a few hazy phrases which add up to instructing the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to draw up proposals on the reduction of all armed forces and on the establishment of effective control for inclusion in the draft treaty, again with the objective of ensuring the observance of the prohibition of atomic weapons.

But where is this prohibition, the observance of which is to be controlled? You say: This is self-evident. But then permit us to ask you to state this clearly and exactly: *to prohibit atomic weapons.*

But the three Governments—the United States, Great Britain and France—do not venture to affirm the prohibition of atomic weapons in clear and precise terms. They evade this question. They restrict themselves merely to instructing the commission to draw up proposals of some sort—and not on the prohibition of atomic weapons at that, but merely on the establishment of control which aims at prohibiting atomic weapons.

One might think that there is some joke here, so lacking in seriousness is this entire point, if one has in view the real desire to solve the problem which is contained in these exceptionally important words: prohibition of atomic weapons, establishment of control to ensure the observance of this prohibition—a few short but exceptionally important words for which millions of people are now struggling, millions of people who will win victory in this struggle despite all the subterfuges, tricks and resistance they encounter on this path. These they will inevitably surmount, and they will indubitably surmount them victoriously.

The delegation of the Soviet Union also proposed to include in the draft resolution of the "Three" its new point on the establishment of the international control agency within the framework of the Security Council. We pointed out that the establishment of such an agency should be provided for in every sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed forces and armaments. The new Point 3 proposed by the delegation of the

USSR, placed under No. 5 in the text of our amendments, points out that the task of this agency should be "control of the reduction of all types of armaments and armed forces, as well as control to ensure that the decision to prohibit atomic weapons is strictly and scrupulously observed and that this international agency will have to obtain information on all armed forces, including semi-military, security and police forces, as well as all armaments, including atomic weapons," and it also envisages effective international inspection to be carried out in accordance with the decisions of the aforesaid international control agency and for this control to include the verification of the submitted information.

Is it possible to speak more clearly of the real aim, tasks and functions defining the rights and duties of this control agency than our amendment does?

So that there will be no lack of clarity whatever regarding the establishment of the international control agency, the delegation of the USSR proposed that the future convention shall provide that the international control agency be entrusted with control over the prohibition of atomic weapons, that it envisage the composition, rights and duties of this agency and also that it instruct this agency to carry out inspection, *i.e.*, verification of all the undertakings for the production and storing of atomic weapons, immediately after the conclusion of the aforesaid convention in order to ascertain whether the convention on the prohibition of atomic weapons has been implemented or not.

The sponsors of the draft resolution keep silent about our proposal for immediate inspection and immediate verification after the conclusion of this convention, irrespective of whether this international control machinery is functioning or not—immediate verification of the production and storing of atomic weapons. They prefer to evade this question. Yet this proposal is of great importance. It proves that the Soviet Union does not propose and does not intend to postpone the control of the prohibition of atomic weapons until some later or very last stage, as provided for in the Baruch plan, and as advocated by the representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France.

I must mention another matter. The memorandum of the

Subcommittee's chairman, Mr. Padilla Nervo, points out, among other things, on page 9 of the Russian text, that these three Powers consider that the establishment of an international control agency is implied in their draft.

But why only implied? Why do the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France only imply the establishment of such an agency while they foam at the mouth, arguing that precisely such an agency is the real key to the settlement of the entire problem of banning atomic weapons?

And does the Subcommittee chairman's memorandum itself not state that only the draft amendments of the Soviet Union contain direct reference to the need for establishing an international control agency?

Yet in the Subcommittee, by the way, certain of the three Powers very stubbornly insisted that this phrase should not be included in Mr. Nervo's memorandum. We had to exert no little effort to show that the truth is the truth and that the memorandum should reflect the truth. I asked then to be shown the point in the draft resolution of the "Three" which speaks of the establishment of an international control agency. But it could not be shown, because it is non-existent.

Is this not a characteristic circumstance?

The representatives of the United States, Great Britain and France are ready to imply many things. They imply the establishment of an international control agency, they imply the prohibition of atomic weapons—they are ready to imply—they will not be found wanting in this matter. But instead of implying, it is necessary to make a direct statement, and this is exactly what they avoid doing.

They say—we do not vouch for ourselves. If the Assembly makes the decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and there is no club over us, such as international control, then we do not vouch for ourselves.

But we do vouch for ourselves that even without a club we will carry out this decision.

Accept this decision!

Mr. Jessup says: "Point 4 is a new point. It contains the same

idea as the Soviet amendment No. 5 and, like their revised Paragraph B of Point 3, makes clear what was clearly expressed in the original tripartite draft, namely that an international control agency must be set up to ensure the carrying out of the disarmament plan."

But now if we turn to revised point 3-B, it says nothing about the establishment of a control agency. This is said indirectly only in the phrase dealing with inspection which should be carried out in conformity with the decisions, as this point states, of "an international control agency that is to be established."

But I say that you are playing with words. Here there is reference to "an international control agency that *is to be established*." But by the same token it may be said that everything is to be established, having in view that it can be established. To say that inspection will be carried out in conformity with the decisions of the "*control agency that is to be established*" by no means signifies the decision to establish such an agency. And if it does signify this, then why not clarify it, why not eliminate unclarity, ambiguity? Why, in such a case, not say precisely and definitely; *the control agency is being established*.

You, however, will not find a proposal to establish such an agency anywhere, either in Point 3, of which I have spoken here, or in any other place, or in this very new Point 4 of the revised draft resolution. This Point 4, really a new point, says that the commission is instructed to formulate "plans for the establishment of an international control agency within the framework of the Security Council." This is what is said here: to formulate plans for the establishment of an international control agency within the framework of the Security Council. It is important to note, however, that this point again does not speak of the establishment of an international control agency itself. Consequently, here we have the same circumvention of the question instead of a precise and definite statement on this score.

From all that has just been said, the following conclusion is self-evident: the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and France, rejecting the proposal for the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, or, to be more exact, the proposal

that the General Assembly declare an unconditional ban on atomic weapons, avoid a direct commitment to establish an international control agency, resorting to camouflage on this question with the help of tangled, nebulous phrases. The new Point 3 proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union and Point 3-B in the revised draft resolution of the "Three" differ not only in wording, not only in formulation — there is a tremendous difference in substance between them. This difference also determines our disagreements.

If the authors of the draft resolution of the "Three" really want the convention to include a reference to the establishment of an international control agency, there is nothing to prevent them from doing so. And this must be done. But they do not do this. This is, however, done by us, the delegation of the Soviet Union, and herein lies the advantage of our proposal.

On December 15 Mr. Jessup, it seems, spoke three times. In his third speech on December 15, Mr. Jessup displayed no little playfulness and exerted no little effort in an attempt to cheer up the First Committee, telling it about the golden chariot drawn by 60 white doves, the magic wand and Cinderella. Apparently Mr. Jessup has mixed things up, imagining perhaps that he is no longer in the Political Committee but among children dancing in a ring around a Christmas Tree. (*Laughter.*) Christmas is approaching. But this would not be so dangerous for the First Committee. Mr. Jessup, however, did not succeed in adopting a serious tone after his witticism even when he turned to the analysis of serious questions discussed in the First Committee.

Really, can one take seriously Mr. Jessup's remark that since the third amendment of the Soviet delegation on the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the preparation of a convention envisaging measures that ensure the implementation of this convention consists of two paragraphs, the first of which speaks of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of control, while the second contains an instruction to the commission to prepare a draft of a corresponding convention, this means, as he said, that there is only a remote connection between these two questions, even the hidden aim to evade the establish-

ment of international control after prohibition of atomic weapons is declared.

Mr. Jessup reproached the Soviet Union for not having shown flexibility by objecting to the Baruch plan for five years. But what flexibility did the United States of America show in insisting upon this plan for five years, declaring that it is the very best plan and that there is none better — even if it did make the reservation that if a better plan appears they will think about it? But they know in advance that no better plan will appear because they consider it the best of all possible plans. Yet they insist, they continue persistently to adhere to the position of this Baruch plan in spite of all fully substantiated and serious criticism to which it has been justly subjected from various sides. I gave facts. Even such a publication as the British newspaper *Times* says that the Baruch plan is a utopian plan. Therefore, it is senseless to defend this plan, unless the aim is to have no plan at all.

Here is the stand of the United States, Great Britain and France. They say: "But you too insist on having your way — no Baruch plan; accept our plan." Then let us examine the reasons for our not wanting your plan. Because it turns a so-called international control agency into an American supertrust, subordinates to it and turns over to it the whole economy of the country whose entire fate will thus be determined arbitrarily by decisions of this international control agency which, even in the words of the advocates of this plan, must inevitably be an agency which will implement the policy of the United States of America. This plan threatens the sovereign rights of nations and states. Therefore, it cannot be agreed to by those who value the sovereignty of their country and their people. The Baruch plan is unacceptable precisely because it threatens the sovereign rights of nations and states. It is also unacceptable because it is fruitless, for it postpones the most important thing to the last stages, again making it dependent upon a number of conditions which, in their turn, are entirely dependent on your discretion.

If mention is made of stages, of ownership which, under the Baruch plan, the control agency has of all atomic raw materials and all atomic undertakings, even those allied to the atomic in-

dustry, it will become clear that of course this plan cannot be accepted by those states which do not want to commit suicide.

Mr. Jessup said, as before, that the Soviet Union proposes prohibition of the atomic weapon on paper. But we have already pointed to the fallacy and groundlessness of this objection. This was also pointed out by the Egyptian delegate in his speech of December 15, whose words on this score I do not think it superfluous to repeat before the members of the committee today.

The Egyptian delegate said:

"It is practically impossible to establish an organization for control over the production of atomic weapons and for the utilization of all atomic energy for civilian purposes, which also means control, without this requiring much time. What are we to do meanwhile?" the Egyptian delegate asked. "Could we not draw a line between the production of atomic weapons, control over these weapons and atomic energy, and the actual use of these weapons? We have," he said, "a certain number of conventions, such as the Red Cross convention, the convention banning the use of poison gas and many others which pursue humane aims. They envisage no other control and no other sanction but moral sanction. Perhaps you remember," the Egyptian delegate said, "that at the beginning of the last World War the United Kingdom, France and Germany pledged themselves not to use poison gas. There was a convention prohibiting the utilization of poison gas, and although this convention has not yet been ratified by all," the Egyptian delegate said, and I will add on my own behalf that it has not yet been ratified for some mysterious reason by the United States of America although more than 40 years have passed since then — I continue quoting the Egyptian delegate — "the pledge not to use poison gas was strictly observed by the three Powers and by the other countries, despite the fact that Europe was faced with so-called total war for the first time.

"Why can we not find," the Egyptian delegate said, "on the same basis, some means of prohibiting the use of atomic weapons, at least of those already existing, inasmuch as full control over the production and utilization of atomic energy for civilian purposes will be a prolonged and tiring process?"

Thus spoke a representative of a small country, and it has already been recommended here that the voice of small countries be listened to, and our delegation fully supports and has always supported these recommendations. Even more, their voices should be respected. Even more, these countries should be respected.

This is the best test of whether the aspirations are peaceful or aggressive. And this should be remembered by the gentlemen sitting on my right, as well. Particularly by them, and not only in connection with Egypt, Mr. Lloyd.

I do not intend to delve into the question of how much time will really be required for establishing a system of international control and for setting into motion the entire machinery of the international control agency.

If, indeed, the establishment and setting into motion of the machinery of international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons will be, as is assumed by the Egyptian delegate and as is also specifically assumed by the representatives of the United States who spoke here about the length of this period, a really prolonged process, it is all the more necessary to recognize that the prohibition of atomic weapons must not be made dependent upon the completion of this process of organization of control, because if it is such a prolonged process, this will be only an additional argument in favor of the impermissibility of tying up the prohibition of atomic weapons with control, with its organization.

This is an additional argument in favor of our stand, in favor of the stand not only of the Soviet Union, but of certain other delegations which have already expressed this view both in their speeches and in their draft resolutions.

If the organization and the setting into motion of the machinery of international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons is dragged out for many months and perhaps even years, and the prohibition of atomic weapons is linked with this control and its going into operation, this would be utterly impermissible, because in this way the very prohibition of atomic weapons, of their production and their use, would really be postponed *ad kalendas Graecas* — for an indefinitely long period, and mankind would al-

ways be in danger of the precipitation of an atomic war at any minute. We are not afraid of it, if we are to speak of the Soviet Union, as we have never been afraid of those who try to attack us or who have attacked us. We have never feared them! But we are a country of peace and for this reason we want to prevent the danger of war which threatens mankind and portends perhaps the greatest of calamities.

As for the delegation of the Soviet Union, while defending its proposal that the General Assembly declare an unconditional ban on atomic weapons, it also upholds the necessity of taking all measures to reduce to a minimum the period for establishing international control. And we even established the date one and a half months ago — February 1, 1952 — for preparing a corresponding convention. We are told that this date is unrealistic.

Gentlemen, are you seriously concerned over the impracticability of this date? Let us discuss the date if you accept our proposal at least in principle. Accept it, and then we will reach an agreement on the date. The matter of the date will not be an obstacle. It would be ridiculous if we subordinated the decision of such an important question as the prohibition of atomic weapons to the question of the date.

But when you say an "unrealistic date" you think that you have discovered an Achilles' heel, and that you can down Achilles himself by striking at it. You are, however, greatly mistaken. We are realists, and for this reason we say: Let us reach an agreement on the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Here we have the General Assembly declaring: Prohibit atomic weapons! But you say: "We do not vouch for ourselves because there is no control over us and we do not know whether we will pass this test."

But we vouch for ourselves that we shall pass the test even if there is no control. In order to check up on this, the well-known British proverb should be followed: "The proof of the pudding is in the eating," otherwise you will never know how it tastes. But you do not vouch for yourselves. This, of course, may give rise to serious apprehensions on the part of those who intend to be your partners, because everyone always presumes that *everyone* vouches

for himself if he undertakes some obligation. But you do not vouch. To a certain extent you may be right in your own way, because many resolutions have already been adopted which you do not fulfill. Many international agreements have been concluded with you which you do not fulfill. Is it worth while to enumerate all these resolutions which *you* adopted but have not fulfilled?

Incidentally, Mr. Jessup has enumerated here those draft resolutions which were submitted by the Soviet Union and declined, as well as the resolutions which were adopted against the will of the Soviet Union and against its vote and have not been fulfilled by the Soviet Union. But he forgot one category of resolutions, those for which the United States as well as Great Britain and France voted, and which have not been fulfilled by them.

It will not be amiss to recall again in this connection that the utopian Baruch plan, as it is called, provides a convenient means for drowning the actual organization of international control and enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about international control.

Now, as follows from Mr. Jessup's recent statement, he does not seem to dare to deny the moral, political and even legal force of the General Assembly's decisions, of which we spoke last time.

But he nevertheless continues to object to our proposal that the General Assembly declare the unconditional ban on atomic weapons and the establishment of international control, claiming that it will be impossible to adopt such a proposal before a control mechanism is set up and put into operation.

Being aware of the weakness of his position, Jessup stated that he could agree to the general idea of the moral, political and legal force of the General Assembly's decisions.

As I have already said, Mr. Jessup referred to certain earlier resolutions of the General Assembly which indeed have neither moral, political nor legal force for the Soviet Union, although, according to Jessup, they are important decisions on the question of peace and international security.

But it is precisely this last circumstance that we question first of all. We voted against these decisions precisely because we doubted their usefulness to the cause of peace and international security.

In other cases we did not and do not recognize the legality of these decisions, for instance the legality of the ignominious resolution on proclaiming the People's Republic of China an aggressor, on using the United Nations in the armed American and Syngman Rhee intervention in Korea and a number of other resolutions. We openly objected to them. We openly voted against them, and it would be absurd to demand that we fulfill these decisions. Indeed, we are here to settle international affairs and not internal state affairs. But in international affairs a state cannot be compelled to do something to which it objects. But the General Assembly is composed of sovereign states, although some of them do not follow their own paths and cannot always even express their own opinions, since they are under very strong pressure, exerted on them for purposes contradicting the principles and provisions of the Charter . . . Mr. Jessup confuses facts here. Had we voted for some resolution and then violated it, it would be right to rebuke us accordingly.

But the actual state of affairs is just the opposite. I shall speak about the third category of the General Assembly's resolutions, over which Mr. Jessup passed in silence, those for which the United States voted and which the United States does not fulfill. Take, for example, the resolution of January 24, 1946, on the study of problems that had arisen in connection with the discovery of atomic energy. Has it been fulfilled by the United States? It has not! Here is another resolution dated December 14, 1946, establishing the general regulation and reduction of armaments and armed forces. Has it been fulfilled by the United States? It has not! Here you have the resolution of November 3, 1947, on measures which must be taken against the instigators of another war. This resolution has not been fulfilled by the United States either. With regard to the USSR, in our press, in statements — I do not mean only official, but even quite ordinary statements — nowhere will you find calls for another war! And what about you?

I have already spoken about the frenzied, mad propaganda with which your notorious magazine *Collier's* has besmirched itself. Just listen to your radio. Look at your press, at all your speakers — *the most responsible ones*, standing on the top of the state ladder

— and you will see and hear endless war calls. After that, we shall discuss the question concerning the allocation of 100,000,000 dollars. Can there be anything more disgraceful than that, than your act dated October 10, 1951?

A decision on the impermissibility of war propaganda has been adopted, but this propaganda is conducted in the United States on the broadest scale; it spreads, forming such a sea, such an ocean, that in comparison with it the Atlantic Ocean is a mere puddle! A decision on the extradition and punishment of war criminals, a decision on mutual relations between the United Nations members and Spain, a decision on false and libelous information — none of these decisions is being fulfilled by the United States. And what about the international agreements, the Yalta agreement, the Potsdam agreement? And you will assert that it is not you who have split Germany into two parts, that it is not you who have set up the Bonn puppet government, that it is not you who are dragging Western Germany into the Atlantic bloc to use it as a springboard for attack. An attack against whom? This is said openly — against the Soviet Union, against the People's Democracies. Does this accord with international agreements? Is this what is called respect for international agreements? Is this what is called respect for the United Nations Charter? Does this correspond to the decisions which I have briefly enumerated here, and does this show respect for the decisions of the General Assembly? It has become customary for you to violate both the decisions of the General Assembly and international agreements which you at one time called gentlemen's agreements! There is the ignominious affair of thrusting Greece into the Security Council. We have had, it seems to me, 17 rounds of voting because the United States seeks the election of Greece at any cost, despite the absence of any legal grounds for this. You will probably achieve your aim because the influence of the dollar is unfortunately still great, as great, in general, as the economic dependence of certain countries on the United States, dependence which still makes itself felt!

And yet in the face of such and similar facts, the representatives of the Atlantic bloc make bold to lecture us concerning respect for the decisions of the General Assembly!

In 1946 we concluded a gentlemen's agreement. We are fulfilling it accurately. But it is precisely the United States that is violating this agreement for all to see. And after this they dare to say that they are not sure that the Soviet Union would fulfill the decisions it signed. Let these gentlemen name at least one decision which bears our signature and which we have violated at any time. Let them show it to us. They will not be able to do this, while we can present dozens of cases of such violations by the United States.

* * *

SOME delegations have submitted amendments, mostly unessential amendments, to the draft resolution of the "Three." But there is one amendment which the delegation of the USSR regards as an important amendment worthy of serious attention: the amendment of the Egyptian delegation of which I have already spoken.

There is another amendment, in the form of a draft resolution, submitted by the Polish delegation and proposing that a decision be made to set up under the Security Council a commission on atomic energy and conventional armaments after the dissolution of the Atomic Energy Commission. It also recommends that the Security Council dissolve the Commission on Conventional Armaments. The Polish draft resolution suggests that the draft resolution of the "Three," as well as the amendments to that draft submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, be referred to the Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission.

The delegation of the Soviet Union thinks that this proposal is important and to the point. The experience of the Subcommittee's work has shown that a careful and patient examination of the question, particularly one of such exceptional importance as the one now before our committee, yields positive results.

It is indeed impossible to deny that for the first time during this period we have succeeded in reaching agreement, though it be only on secondary questions, and that, what is more important, despite sharp differences in principle separating us from you—the United States, Great Britain and France—both sides displayed due tactfulness, patience and thoughtfulness in considering various questions,

which, of course, cannot be disregarded when questions of primary political importance are being settled.

That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union maintains that the experience of the Subcommittee's work has shown that thorough and patient study of questions, particularly those of such exceptional importance, gives positive results, as I have said.

Mr. Nervo, chairman of the Subcommittee, points out that despite the existing differences — unfortunately large and serious differences — in the proposals of the Soviet Union and of the three Powers on a number of questions of primary importance, a certain degree of agreement has been reached in the Subcommittee on a number of aspects of both programs, and the discussion of these questions in the Subcommittee has helped to broaden the range of agreement on certain questions, even if they are of a secondary nature.

This gives every reason to support the proposal of the delegation of the Polish Republic which, as we understand it, proceeds from the possibility of further fruitful effort in the search for a generally agreed solution to the question of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons, reduction of armaments and armed forces and the establishment of an international control agency to enforce the observance of the decisions adopted on this score.

The delegation of the USSR has always striven for agreed decisions. It is striving for this now too, confident that such agreed decisions can be reached in the Committee of Twelve, provided there is good will, mutual respect and genuine striving for the consolidation of international cooperation, peace and the security of nations.

Therefore, we fully support the proposal submitted by the delegation of the Polish Republic.

All quotations in this speech have been retranslated from the Russian.

For Factual Material on the USSR-

- For texts of statements by the Soviet Government
- For articles on Soviet life
- For stories of the Soviet people
- For interesting pictures

Read

USSR INFORMATION BULLETIN



The USSR Information Bulletin is a 32-page illustrated magazine issued twice a month by the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Washington.



For a limited period, subscriptions will be accepted at a special holiday rate of \$1.00 a year. To take advantage of this special rate, readers of this pamphlet should address their requests to:

USSR Information Bulletin, Dept. B.
2112 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington 8, D.C.

Enclose \$1.00 check, money order or cash. Be sure to include postal zone number and print your name and address.

(Sample copies on request.)